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Abstract 
 
On December 14, 2006, FDA proposed two new regulations in the Federal Register 
amending current regulations governing expanded access to investigational drugs for treatment 
use and charging for investigational drugs. The proposal comes at a time when FDA has been 
under new pressure to provide seriously ill patients with early access to investigational drugs 
outside the framework of clinical trials. In recent years, patient advocacy groups have filed 
citizen petitions with FDA asking the agency to provide specific criteria for obtaining access or 
to create an early approval mechanism to provide access. Further, FDA has seen proposed 
federal legislation intended to ensure early patient access to investigational treatments and nearly 
lost a lawsuit in federal court in which terminally ill patients sought a fundamental right of 
access to investigational therapies under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 
  The proposed regulations seek to assuage patient activists, physicians, drug sponsors, and 
other critics who contend that FDA must strike an appropriate balance between allowing patient 
access to promising treatments while protecting against undue risks and safeguarding the clinical 
trials process.  Although FDA heralded the announcement of the rules as a key step forward to 
improving patient access, the proposal fails to expand access beyond measures currently 
available under longstanding agency practice and, in fact, creates additional regulatory barriers 
and disincentives for industry participation in expanded access programs.  
  This paper examines the proposal in light of historical agency regulation and recent 
pressures to expand access. Section II describes the historical development of FDA’s statutory 
authority to regulate drugs and the traditional new drug approval process. Section III describes 
the various methods through which FDA has allowed expanded access to investigational 
treatments since 1962. Section IV recounts various recent pressures on FDA to reform its 
expanded access procedures and describes the context in which FDA’s recent proposal has 
arisen. Section V details the changes proposed in both the proposed rules to expand access to 
investigational treatment and charging for investigational drugs. Section VI evaluates the 
proposed regulations and argues that the proposal is likely to decrease access for patients 
because new restrictions on charging provide no incentive for industry participation and the 
proposed regulations create increased regulatory barriers to access inconsistent with FDA’s 
statutory mandate.    3 
FDA’s Proposed Regulations to Expand Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment 
Use: The Status Quo in the Guise of Reform 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  On December 14, 2006, FDA proposed two new regulations in the Federal Register 
amending current regulations governing expanded access to investigational drugs for treatment 
use
1 and charging for investigational drugs.
2 The proposals come at a time when FDA has been 
under new pressure to provide seriously ill patients with early access to investigational drugs 
outside the framework of clinical trials. In recent years, patient advocacy groups have filed 
citizen petitions with FDA asking the agency to provide specific criteria to patients and sponsors 
seeking expanded access or to create an early approval mechanism to permit easier access to 
investigational therapies.  Further, FDA has seen proposed federal legislation intended to ensure 
early patient access to investigational treatments and nearly lost a lawsuit in federal court in 
which terminally ill patients sought a fundamental right of access to investigational therapies 
under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
3 
  The proposed rules seek to assuage patient activists, physicians, drug sponsors, and other 
critics who contend that FDA must strike an appropriate balance between allowing patient access 
to promising treatments while protecting against undue risk and safeguarding the clinical trials 
process.  Although FDA heralded the announcement of the rules as a key step forward to 
                                                 
1 Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75147 (proposed 
Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) [hereinafter Proposed Rules to Expand 
Access]. 
2 Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75168 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R., pt. 312) [hereinafter Proposed Rules for Charging]. 
3 See infra, Section IV, notes 211 to 270 and accompanying text.    4 
improving patient access,
4 the proposal does not expand access beyond measures currently 
available under longstanding agency practice and, in fact, creates additional regulatory barriers 
and disincentives for industry participation in expanded access programs.  
  This paper examines the proposal in light of historical agency regulation and recent 
pressures to expand access. Section II describes the historical development of FDA’s statutory 
authority to regulate drugs and the traditional new drug approval process. Section III describes 
the various methods through which FDA has allowed expanded access to investigational 
treatments since 1962. Section IV recounts various recent pressures on FDA to reform its 
expanded access procedures and describes the context in which FDA’s recent proposal has 
arisen. Section V details the changes proposed in both the proposed rules to expand access to 
investigational treatment and charging for investigational drugs. Section VI evaluates the rules 
and argues that the proposal will fail to expand access for patients because new restrictions on 
charging provide no incentive for industry participation and the proposed regulations create 
increased regulatory barriers to access inconsistent with FDA’s statutory mandate.  
 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FDA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
A. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906  
The first chapter of federal food and drug regulation begins in 1906
5 when Congress 
enacted the Pure Food and Drugs Act (“1906 Act”).
6 The 1906 Act, which was intended to 
                                                 
4 See Press Release, FDA Proposes Rules Overhaul to Expand Availability of Experimental 
Drugs (Dec. 11, 2006) available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01520.html.  
5 Although Congress had enacted various drug regulation statutes during the 19
th century, the 
Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 can fairly be described as the birth of the modern era of food 
and drug regulation. For a discussion of the first drug regulation in the United States, see Wesley 
J. Heath, America’s First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of   5 
address concerns over widespread adulteration and impurity in food and drugs, imposed a variety 
of labeling and disclosure requirements on drug manufacturers.
7 Though undoubtedly a 
“landmark in the modern control of drugs”
8, the 1906 Act did not require any premarket approval 
of new drugs and did not protect consumers against unsafe drugs.
9 Although the drawbacks of 
the 1906 Act were readily apparent,
10 increased industry opposition prevented any reform of the 
food and drug laws for the next thirty-two years.
11  
 
B. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
As would occur throughout the 20
th century, a major public health crisis forced Congress 
to revisit the scope of federal drug legislation. In September and October of 1937 more than one 
                                                                                                                                                            
1848, 59 Food & Drug. L.J. 169 (2004). For additional background, see Peter Barton Hutt, Drug 
Regulations in the United States, 2 INTL. J. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 619, 619 
(1986). 
6 Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21. U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.).  The 1906 Act passed with overwhelming 
support despite heavy opposition from both food and drug manufacturers. For a more detailed 
discussion of the origins of the 1906 Act see Wallace F. Janssen, The U.S. Food & Drug Law: 
How it Came; How it Works, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 132, 134 (1980).  
7 Among other things, the 1906 Act prohibited false and misleading labeling of drugs, the 
distribution of adulterated or misbranded drugs, and required labeling the quantity and 
ingredients of a small number of particularly dangerous drugs. See, e.g., JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, 
PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989); James L. Zelenay 
Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a 
Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 263-264 (2005).  
8 WILLIAM M. WARDELL & LOUIS LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 6 (1975). 
9 For additional background about federal food and drug policy in the early 20
th century, see 
PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35-37 
(1980). 
10 See, e.g., DEPT. OF AGRIC., 1917 REPORT OF THE USDA BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY, in HUTT & 
MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d
 ed. 1991). 
11 See Janssen, supra note 6, at 135-37 (discussing defeat of proposed food and drug reforms in 
1933 in the wake of massive opposition by the drug and advertising industries).    6 
hundred people died after ingesting Elixir Sulfanilamide.
12 Sulfanilamide had been safely used in 
caplet form to treat streptococcal infections, but in 1937 the S.E. Massengilll Co., responding to 
consumer demand, developed a liquid version of the drug.
13 Massengill’s scientists found that a 
solution of diethylene glycol effectively dissolved sulfanilamide and the new elixir successfully 
passed all tests for flavor, appearance, and fragrance.
14 Massengill, under no obligation to test 
new drugs for toxicity under the 1906 Act, promptly shipped the new formulation across the 
country.
15 Had Massengill conducted any tests for safety, the company would have discovered 
that diethylene glycol, the equivalent of modern day antifreeze, was a deadly poison.
16 Those 
who died from the drug, many of them children, suffered “intense and unrelenting pain,”
17 and 
the resultant public outrage prompted Congressional action.  
  In 1938, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
18 (“FD&C Act”). 
The FD&C Act for the first time required drug manufacturers to test all new drugs for safety and 
obtain FDA approval prior to any commercial distribution.
19 Specifically, the FD&C Act 
required manufacturers of any “new drug”
20 to file a new drug application (NDA) with FDA
21 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug 
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 295, 302 (2000).  For a detailed description 
of the sulfanilamide tragedy and the federal response, see Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, 
Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (Jun. 1981) 
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.  
13 See Ballentine, supra note 12. See also TEMIN, supra note 9 at 43.  
14 Ballentine, supra note 12.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. See also REPORT OF THE SEC’Y OF AGRIC. ON DEATHS DUE TO ELIXIR SULFANILAMIDE, S. 
DOC. NO. 75-124, at 1-3 (2d Sess. 1937).  
17 Ballentine, supra note 12.  
18 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. [hereinafter “FD&C Act”]. 
19 FD&C Act § 505 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
20 The FD&C Act defined a “new drug” as “(1) Any drug the composition of which is such that 
such drug is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use…; or (2) Any drug the composition of   7 
detailing medical and scientific data about the drug’s safety for human consumption.
22 Though 
the FD&C Act required an “effective” NDA prior to commercialization of a drug, the 1938 
statute provided that a new drug application would automatically become effective after sixty 
days unless FDA provided affirmative notice to the contrary.
23 Though a sizable increase in 
regulatory authority from the 1906 Act, the FD&C Act did not therefore constitute true pre-
market approval in the sense that we understand it today.  
In order to authorize clinical trials intended to determine drug safety, Congress 
specifically authorized FDA to promulgate regulations exempting “drugs intended solely for 
investigational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the 
safety of drugs.”
24 The FD&C Act did not specifically authorize any investigational use of drugs 
for treatment. The new act dramatically increased FDA’s authority to set safety standards and 
restrict the availability of dangerous drugs and represented a “major shift toward consumer 
protection through risk regulation[.]”
25 
 
C. The Drug Amendments of 1962 
  The modern statutory framework under which new drugs are approved today arose out of 
a second public health crisis in the 1960s. Thalidomide, a drug that had been successfully 
marketed in Europe during the 1950s to reduce morning sickness in pregnant women, was found 
                                                                                                                                                            
which is such that such drug, as a result of investigations to determine its safety for use under 
such conditions, has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such 
investigations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.” 
FD&C Act, Ch. 675, § 201(p), 52 Stat. 1040, 1042 (1938). 
21 Id. at § 505(a). 
22 Id. at § 505(b).  
23 Id. at § 505(c).  
24 Id. at § 505(i). 
25 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 302-03.    8 
to have caused severe birth defects in thousands of children.
26 Though never approved in the 
United States, the tragedy brought new public clamor for tougher premarket drug regulation.
27  
Even though FDA had consistently withheld approval of NDAs for Thalidomide within the 
sixty-day statutory period required under the 1938 FD&C Act, all that had stood between the 
public and the dangers of Thalidomide was a single FDA scientist, Dr. Francis Kelsey, who 
diligently marked each submitted NDA as “incomplete” before each sixty-day statutory 
deadline.
28 Even so, Dr. Kelsey had not withheld approval of Thalidomide based on any indicia 
of danger in the NDAs themselves (as no such data were present) but rather due to “insufficient 
information.”
29  Because FDA had no authority to supervise clinical testing of new drugs, 
millions of tablets of thalidomide had been distributed to U.S. physicians in preparation for 
human testing.
30 
  In direct response to the “near miss”
31 of a widespread thalidomide disaster, Congress 
passed the Drug Amendments of 1962
32 (Amendments), altering the regulatory landscape in a 
number of important ways. The Amendments expanded FDA’s mandate with regard to new drug 
approvals, requiring FDA to determine a new drug’s effectiveness in addition to its safety and 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., HARVEY TEFF & COLIN R. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 1-10 
(1976). For a detailed history of the thalidomide crisis, see THE INSIGHT TEAM OF THE SUNDAY 
TIMES OF LONDON, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979).   
27 See Zelenay, supra note 7, at 265.  
28 Linda Bren, Frances Oldham Kelsey: FDA Medical Reviewer Leaves Her Mark on History, 
FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE (Mar.-Apr. 2001) available at 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/201_kelsey.html. See also TEMIN, supra note 9, at 123. 
29 TEMIN, supra note 9, at 123.  
30 Id. at 124.  
31 See 108 CONG. REC. 21,070 (1962) (statement of Rep. Reuss) (arguing that the thalidomide 
tragedy demonstrated need for increased FDA authority to prevent a similar incident). See also 
Zelenay, supra note 7, at 266.  
32 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301-381). For a detailed description of the origins and effects of the Drug 
Amendments of 1962, see Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 
185 (1972).   9 
obligating drug sponsors to collect data through “adequate and well controlled investigations, 
including clinical investigations” conducted by experts.
33 The Amendments instituted the first 
true requirement of affirmative FDA pre-market approval for new drugs, eliminating the old 
regime where an NDA could become effective automatically after sixty days.
34  
The new law required drug sponsors to gain FDA approval prior to undertaking any 
clinical trials,
35 expanding FDA authority to regulate the development of new drugs before a 
sponsor sought marketing approval.
36 The Amendments did not include any statutory provision 
for investigational use of unapproved drugs for treatment, and limited the IND exemption only 
for use in clinical investigations.
37 
 
D. The New Drug Approval Process 
In response to the 1962 Amendments, FDA promulgated complex and detailed 
regulations establishing pre-market approval procedures for new drugs, requiring extensive 
testing for both safety and effectiveness under controlled clinical trials.
38 These regulations 
continue to provide the general regulatory framework under which new drugs are developed and 
approved today.   
 
1. Investigational New Drug (IND) Applications  
                                                 
33 Drug Amendments of 1962, § 102(c), amending Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 
§505(d). 
34 Id. at § 104(b), amending Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(c). 
35 Id. at § 102(b), amending Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(i). 
36 See David W. Jordan, International Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Prescription 
Drug Approval, 25 VAND J. TRASNAT’L L. 471, 478 (1992).  
37 Drug Amendments of 1962 at § 102(b). 
38 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20 – 312.130 (2007).    10 
FDA’s jurisdiction over new drug development begins quite early in the developmental 
process. In order to conduct any research on human beings, a drug sponsor must first submit an 
investigational new drug (IND) application.”
39  However, in order to submit an IND, the drug 
sponsor must first conduct preclinical investigations on laboratory animals
40 in order to “identify 
the nature of the chemical entity being investigated” and to “establish sufficient evidence” of 
toxicity “to determine if it is reasonably safe for human beings in preliminary clinical 
investigations.”
41 A drug sponsor may need as much as three and a half years to complete pre-
clinical investigations and assemble all the necessary data to submit the IND.
42 
Provided FDA approves the IND application, the drug sponsor may then move on to the 
first of three phases of required human clinical investigations.
43 During Phase I trials, the drug is 
administered in low doses to a small group of healthy human volunteers, through which 
researchers obtain toxicity and pharmacology information regarding potential adverse effects on 
human beings.
44 These tests are primarily aimed to determine the drug’s safety and presumably 
                                                 
39 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20 – 312.38 (2007). 
40 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8) (2007) (mandating disclosure of pharmacological and 
toxicological effects on laboratory animals).  
41 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.22 (2007). The IND application must additionally include general 
information about the drug sponsor and any planned clinical investigations, protocols for the 
planned studies, detailed information about the drug’s chemical nature and any human 
experience with the drug, and any other relevant information about the drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 
312.23.  
42 See Zelenay, supra note 7, at 267.  
43 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2007). After submitting the IND application, a drug sponsor must wait 
thirty days to allow FDA to review the application. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (2007). If FDA 
responds favorably, or does not respond within the thirty-day time period, the sponsor may begin 
clinical investigations pursuant to the standards set forth in the IND application and in agency 
regulations. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.40(b), 312.50 (2007).  
44 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.   11 
will uncover any obvious and substantial negative effects.
45 Phase I testing requires an average 
of six to twelve months to complete.
46  
Assuming positive results in Phase I, researchers may then proceed to Phase II. These 
trials are primarily geared towards determining the drug’s effectiveness.
47 Clinicians conduct 
controlled studies on a small group of human volunteers, generally involving patients who suffer 
from the disease or condition that the sponsor intends the drug to treat.
48 During Phase II, 
researchers clarify dosage requirements, evaluate the drug’s actual therapeutic effects, and 
compare the new drug’s effects with those of currently existing drugs.
49 Phase II typically lasts 
between eighteen months and two years.
50 
Phase III represents the longest and most intensive phase of clinical investigations. In 
order to proceed to Phase III, data from the first two phases must offer a reasonable assurance 
that the drug is effective and safe, and that the potential benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of 
a large-scale clinical trial.
51 During this phase, hundreds or thousands of subjects are enrolled to 
participate in large-scale, generally controlled, clinical trials.
52 Phase III trials further develop 
effectiveness data for the investigational drug, closely examine the dose-response relationship of 
                                                 
45 See Greenberg, supra note 12, at 304.  
46 See, e.g., Alison R. McCabe, Note, A Precarious Balancing Act: The Role of FDA as 
Protector of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 787, 790 n.26 (2003) 
(citing average of twelve months for Phase I testing). Cf. Charles J. Walsh & Alyssa Pyrich, 
Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices; Perspectives on 
Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 906 (1995) (stating typical 
Phase I tests of approximately six months). 
47 21 C.F.R. §312.21(b) 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 See Zelenay, supra note 7 at 267 (stating average Phase II testing lasts for two years). See also 
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 46, at 907 (reporting average length of 18 months for Phase II 
trials).  
51 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c). 
52 Id.   12 
the new drug, and allow for more data about any potential adverse effects or drug interactions.
53 
Phase III trials are extremely costly and very time-consuming, lasting an average of three years.
54 
 
2. The New Drug Application (NDA) 
Upon successful completion of all three phases of clinical trials, the drug sponsor may 
submit a new drug application (NDA) to FDA.
55  The NDA, a comprehensive and exhaustively 
detailed application, must include all of the data generated from preclinical and clinical 
investigations as well as numerous other requirements.
56  Under the FD&C Act, FDA must 
technically approve or reject the NDA within 180 days of its filing.
57  However, FDA has 
narrowly interpreted the term “filing,” stating that an NDA will not be considered filed until it is 
“approvable.”
58  If FDA determines that the application does not contain sufficient information 
for approval, it need not begin the review process until the sponsor provides the required 
information.
59  Once the NDA is “filed,” FDA will make its own determination regarding the 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 See Zelenay, supra note 7 at 267. See also McCabe, supra note 46, at 790, n.26. 
55 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000). See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2007). Some drugs, such as 
generic copies of existing brand name drugs, are eligible to file an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA), which requires substantially less information, in order to expedite the 
approval process. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a) (2007). 
56 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50. The application must include 1) full reports from 
the preclinical and clinical trials which have been made to show whether the drug is safe and 
effective for use; 2) a full list of the drug’s ingredients or components; 3) a full statement of the 
drug’s composition; 4) a full description of manufacturing, processing, and packaging methods 
and controls; 5) any samples of the drug or of the articles used as components in the drug as may 
be required by FDA; and 6) samples of the proposed labeling. The NDA must additionally 
disclose all investigators who worked on the clinical trials and their reports, as well as the patent 
number and expiration dates of any patents related to or impacted by the drug under 
consideration. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2007). 
57 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1). 
58 21 C.F.R. § 314.125 (2007) 
59 See Zelenay, supra note 7, at 268.    13 
drug’s safety and effectiveness, and, upon weighing the potential risks of the new drug against its 
benefits, determines whether the drug should be approved for commercialization.
60 
The new drug approval process, as developed after 1962, is therefore both extremely 
labor and cost intensive for potential drug developers. During the 1970s, development costs 
soared while the development process dragged on – some estimates suggest that the drug 
development process, spanning from initial research to market, took an average of eight years to 
complete and cost more than fifty million dollars per drug.
61 These costs have largely increased 
over time: in 1990, new drug development in the United States was estimated to average nearly 
twelve years and 230 million dollars per new drug.
62 More recent surveys from 2000-2002 
suggest the average total cost of an NDA for a new chemical entity has risen to approximately 
$1.7 billion, while another study indicates that the total time of development, including 
nonclinical research as well as IND testing and NDA review, had exceeded 14 years by the late 
1990s – despite expedited administrative review under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act.
63 
                                                 
60 Id. at 268-69.  Other limitations can arise even after approval of the NDA. FDA can withdraw 
or suspend approval at any time if new evidence suggests the drug is not safe or effective. See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(e). FDA therefore requires sponsors to provide periodic reports about any adverse 
effects associated with the drug. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 52 (1999), available at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/1999report.html. Additionally, 
FDA can require the drug manufacturer to conduct “Phase IV” postmarket surveillance studies to 
obtain additional safety and effectiveness data. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.303-310.305 (2007). See 
also Zelenay, supra note 7, at 270.  
61 See Revitalizing New Product Development From Clinical Trials Through FDA Review: 
Hearing on S. 1477 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 
219-30 (1996) (statement of Fred W. Lyons Jr., Chairman, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.). For a 
summary of the various barriers to drug development, see Greenberg, supra note 12.  
62 See Drugs and Biologics: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the House Comm. on Commerce, 104
th Cong. 1-2 (1995) (statement of Congressman Joe Barton). 
63 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 776-778 
(3d ed. 2007). For further statistical information on the rising cost and delay of drug 
development, see generally Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Longer Clinical 
Times are Extending Time to Market for New Drugs in U.S., 7 IMPACT REP., No. 6 (Nov./Dec.   14 
 
E. AIDS and The New Pressures of the Consumer Activist Movement  
The traditional paradigm of drug regulation, carefully crafted to protect the public from 
dangerous and ineffective drugs through rigorous pre-approval standards, met new opposition 
from activists seeking increased access to drugs during the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s.
64 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a retroviral disease that hijacks the body’s 
immune system and destroys its ability to combat illness,
65 first emerged in the early 1980s as 
disproportionate numbers of homosexual men fell ill to an unknown and deadly illness.
66  By 
1982, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had identified the new virus,
67 but subsequent 
progress in understanding and treatment of the disease remained quite slow.
68 In the early years 
of AIDS, the disease affected primarily politically unpopular minorities such as homosexuals and 
intravenous drug users, as a result of which mainstream society largely failed to respond.
69 
Despite the looming presence of a serious public health crisis, through 1987 AIDS had not 
become a major political issue, government research expenditures remained relatively small, and 
FDA had not approved a single treatment for the disease.
70 Meanwhile, desperately ill and dying 
victims of the disease, lacking any legitimate treatment and facing imminent death, fervently 
                                                                                                                                                            
2005); Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development in the United States 1963 to 1999, 69 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 286 (2001). 
64 For a comprehensive discussion of the ways in which the rise of AIDS challenged the 
traditional paradigm of FDA’s drug approval scheme, see Greenberg, supra note 12. 
65 See PETER S. ARNO & KARYN L. FEIDEN, AGAINST THE ODDS: THE STORY OF AIDS DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT, POLITICS, AND PROFITS 15-17 (1992).  
66 Id. at 2-4.  
67 Id. at 4. 
68 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 309.  
69 Id. at 310.  See also ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 65, at 4-5.  
70 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 310.   15 
pursued any available glimmer of hope – no matter how far-fetched or unlikely.
71  Rumors and 
anecdotes spread about various untested compounds, and persons with AIDS experimented with 
myriad unknown, generally ineffective, and sometimes dangerous self-treatments.
72 
The AIDS activist movement arose from this context, as those communities most affected 
by the virus shared a growing perception that the government response to the AIDS crisis was 
entirely inadequate.
73 Various activist organizations developed to improve the lives of people 
living with AIDS. Examples include the Gay Men’s Health Crisis, the People With AIDS Health 
Group, and the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), a militant group that utilized 
confrontational tactics to achieve political and regulatory reform.
74 Although this grassroots 
movement pressed for a variety of social and political goals, increased access to experimental 
and investigational therapies became a key concern. AIDS activism created additional public 
awareness and increased political pressure on the FDA to promote access to new treatments, and 
played a key role in efforts to reform FDA’s drug approval process.
75  
A complete description of the reforms achieved during the AIDS crisis is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but a few noteworthy developments must be acknowledged. Recognizing 
that patients confronting imminent death face far more limited risks from experimental 
medication than the general public, and that even the most remote probabilities for improvement 
may generate enormous benefits, FDA undertook a variety of initiatives to increase access for 
                                                 
71 Id. at 311. 
72 Id. at 311 (describing treatment with remedies such s AL-721, derived from egg yolks, 
attempts by persons with AIDS to synthesize remedies using “kitchen chemistry,” and the rise of 
black market buying clubs to facilitate purchase of drugs available overseas. See also ARNO & 
FEIDEN, supra note 65, at 60-70. 
73 See Greenberg, supra note 12, at 310-12. 
74 Id. at 311-12. See also ARNO & FEIDEN, supra note 65, at 65-68, 73-82. 
75 See Greenberg, supra note 12, at 312.    16 
unapproved treatments and expedite approval processes for new drugs for untreatable illnesses.
76 
Between 1987 and 1993, FDA formalized various exemptions to the IND application process 
allowing for treatment and emergency use of investigational drugs for seriously ill patients,
77 
promulgated “Subpart E”
78 and “accelerated approval”
79 regulations designed to expedite FDA 
review of new drugs designed to treat life-threatening or seriously debilitating diseases
80, and 
instituted the “parallel track” program for expanded access specifically to HIV/AIDS therapies.
81  
 
F. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997  
The efforts to expand access for the seriously ill in the wake of AIDS reflect a tension at 
the heart of FDA’s regulatory mandate: while the traditional regulatory mission to protect the 
public from dangerous or ineffective drugs generally serves the public good, that mission can 
impose increased harm to those whose interests are primarily threatened by an absence of 
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78 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.80 (2007).  
79 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2007) (providing for accelerated approval of drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 
601.4 (2007) (providing for accelerated approval of biologicals, such as vaccines.)  
80 Subpart E established a variety of measures to expedite review of new drugs for serious 
diseases such as AIDS, including early and repeated FDA consultation with pharmaceutical 
developers to speed the clinical trial process, consolidation of Phase II and III clinical testing, 
and use of increased “Phase IV” post-marketing trials to postpone the burden of additional safety 
research until after approval. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.82 (2007) (early consultation between FDA 
and drug sponsors); 21 C.F.R. § 312.87 (2007) (FDA involvement in clinical trials); 21 C.F.R. § 
312.85 (2007) (Phase IV post-marketing trials). Accelerated approvals regulations went even 
further, allowing for the use of “surrogate endpoints” in clinical trials, allowing FDA to approve 
a drug based on measurements other than increased patient survival, such as measuring CD4 cell 
counts in AIDS patients. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2007).  
81 See Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track Mechanism 
for People With AIDS and other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (1992). The parallel 
track policy, while similar to the Treatment IND regulations, derived from an earlier expanded 
access collaboration with the National Cancer Institute, described infra, Section III notes 173 to 
182 and accompanying text. For a more detailed description of the parallel track policy, see infra 
Section III, notes 163 to 172 and accompanying text.    17 
treatment.
82 The reform measures of the late 1980s and 1990s addressed this tension, but by no 
means resolved it. Those who face life-threatening diseases for which no viable treatment 
options exist, continue to argue that the pace of drug development remains too slow and access 
either too restrictive, too confusing, or both.  
While the use of investigational drugs for therapy, rather than for investigation, is 
actually quite common, the regulatory landscape remains unclear. Many types of “expanded 
access” programs exist under different names and terminologies, but only a handful of such 
programs are actually reflected in the IND regulations
83 -- and even those that are specifically 
referred to in the regulations are not necessarily defined.
84 Additionally, the existing IND 
regulations failed to address various specific criteria governing FDA’s decision to allow access 
in a variety of situations.
85 
Responding in part to criticisms that FDA’s procedures had led to inconsistent policies, 
inequitable access, and preferential access for certain categories of disease, Congress undertook a 
major initiative to revise FDA’s statutory mandate.
86  In 1997, Congress enacted the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA),
87 a broad piece of legislation that amended 
numerous sections of the FD&C Act. The full effect of FDAMA lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.  However, a key aspect of the statute, inserted as § 561 of the FD&C Act, provides 
specific statutory authority for expanded access to investigational drugs.
88  
                                                 
82 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 328. 
83 See infra, Section III. 
84 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63 at 652. 
85 See infra, Section III.  
86 See Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75149. 
87 Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FDAMA]. 
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As described in the next section of this paper, FDAMA’s provisions largely parallel 
existing FDA regulations. Mirroring the emergency use IND regulation
89, the Act grants 
discretion to FDA to provide investigational drugs or devices for “the diagnosis, monitoring, or 
treatment of a serious disease or condition in emergency situations.”
90  Similarly, § 561(c) 
parallels FDA’s treatment IND regulations,
91 authorizing the FDA to permit expanded access to 
an investigational drug or device if 1) it is intended to treat a “serious or immediately life-
threatening disease or condition;” 2) no “comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy” is 
available for the patients to which the drug or device will be administered; 3) the drug or device 
is currently in a controlled clinical trial under a traditional IND or all clinical trials necessary for 
approval have been completed; and 4) the drug sponsor is “actively pursuing marketing 
approval” of the drug or device with “due diligence.”
92 The statute also requires that any use 
under a treatment IND must not interfere with “the enrollment of patients in ongoing clinical 
trials,”
93 that for treatment of a “serious disease” there must be “sufficient evidence of safety and 
effectiveness” to support use of the drug for treatment,
94 and that for treatment of a “life-
threatening disease” the “available scientific evidence, taken as a whole” must provide a 
“reasonable basis to conclude” that the drug or device “may be effective for its intended use and 
would not expose patients to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury.”
95 
                                                 
89 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (2007).  
90 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a). 
91 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2007). 
92 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(c)(1)-(4). 
93 Id. at § 360bbb(c)(5). 
94 Id. at § 360bbb(c)(6). 
95 Id. at § 360bbb(c)(7) (emphasis added).   19 
§ 561(b) allows for individual patient access to investigational products for serious 
diseases.
96 Although this provision does not mirror any existing FDA regulations, it simply 
codifies longstanding agency practice.
97 The act provides that any patient, acting through a 
physician, may request and obtain access to an investigational drug or device for treatment of a 
“serious disease or condition” directly from a “manufacturer or distributor” if 1) the licensed 
physician determines that the patient has no satisfactory alternative therapy to treat the disease or 
condition, 2) FDA determines there is “sufficient safety and effectiveness to support the use” of 
the drug or device, 3) FDA determines that providing the drug or device will not interfere with 
“the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations to support marketing approval” 
and 4) the sponsor of the drug or device has submitted a clinical protocol under § 505(i) of the 
FD&C Act.
98  
The three types of expanded access programs included in FDAMA’s amendments to the 
FD&C Act did not, therefore, expand access beyond already existing agency practice. Further, 
FDAMA did little to clarify the confusing landscape of FDA regulations, guidance, and policy in 
this area. In the wake of the new legislation, patient advocacy groups and other organizations 
have increasingly pressured FDA to modify existing regulations and clarify agency policy.
99 In 
order to “further address the concerns that motivated Congress” to include expanded access 
provisions in FDAMA
100, FDA has proposed new rules detailing requirements for expanded 
access to investigational drugs
101 and charging for investigational drugs.
102 
                                                 
96 Id. at § 21 U.S.C. §360bbb(b). 
97 See Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75148. See also HUTT, MERRILL & 
GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 653. 
98 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(b). 
99 See infra, Section IV.   
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The next section of this paper discusses the various methods through which FDA permits 
expanded access to investigational drugs under the current statutory and regulatory scheme, and 
under informal agency policy.  
 
III. USE OF INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT 
A. Administrative History of “Expanded Access” 
  As described previously, Section 505(i) of the FD&C Act was originally included in the 
1938 statute, and amended in 1962, specifically to authorize clinical investigations used to gather 
data necessary for submission of an NDA.
 103  So too, at least until the Drug Amendments of 
1962, the agency’s regulations specifically required that investigational drugs be made available 
“solely for investigational use by or under the direction of an expert qualified by scientific 
training and experience to investigate the safety of such drug.”
104  Prior to 1962, no FDA 
publications or articles discussing the new drug approval process specifically addressed the use 
of investigational drugs for therapy outside of clinical investigations.
105  
  Simultaneously, since 1938 FDA has consistently maintained the position that a drug 
cannot be “commercialized” prior to approval.
106  IND regulations promulgated in 1962 
specified that a drug sponsor can neither “commercially distribute nor test-market” a drug before 
approval and that FDA can terminate an IND upon learning that the drug “is being or is to be 
sold or otherwise distributed for commercial purposes not justified by the requirements of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
102 Proposed Rules for Charging, supra note 2. 
103 See supra, notes 24 &35 and accompanying text.  
104 21 C.F.R. § 130.2(a)(2)(1962). See also HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 651. 
105 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 651. 
106 Id.   21 
investigation.”
107  Beginning in 1963, this ban on pre-approval “commercialization” of an 
investigational drug, absent very unusual circumstances, was additionally reflected on the IND 
form itself, which required sponsors who intended to charge for an investigational drug to 
provide “a full explanation why sale is required and should not be regarded as the 
commercialization of a new drug for which an application is not approved.”
108  
  In fact, however, FDA has a long history of permitting the use of investigational drugs 
for treatment outside of clinical trials, dating as far back as 1962.
109 For instance, orphan drugs 
have been used for treatment use under INDS since 1962.
110 Additionally, several thousand 
patients in the 1970s received the drug metoprolol, a cardioselective ß-blocker, under a 
“treatment protocol” outside the clinical trial process.
111 Similarly, in the 1980s various 
antiarrhythmic drugs were made available to over 20,000 patients with complex, life-threatening 
arrhythmia prior to any NDA approval.
112 Beginning in the mid-1970s, FDA and the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI) organized a system to distribute promising “Group C cancer drugs” to 
                                                 
107 27 Fed. Reg. 7990 (Aug. 10, 1962), 28 Fed. Reg. 179 (Jan. 8, 1963), codified at 21 C.F.R. 
130.3(a)(11), 130.3(d)(8) (1962) See also HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 651.  
108 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 651. 
109 See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Expanded Access, supra note 1, at 75148; see also FDA, 
“Speeding Access to Important Therapeutic Agents,” http://www.fda.gov/oashi/speedaccess.html 
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Nightingale, The FDA’s New Procedures for the Use of Investigational Drugs in Treatment, 259 
JAMA 2267 (Apr. 15, 1988) (describing instances of access to investigational drugs dating back 
to 1976).  
110 See infra notes  195 to 203 and accompanying text.  
111 See Young, supra note 109, at 2267.  
112 Id.   22 
patients in need.
113 These “treatment protocols” all arose after basic studies of a drug were “well 
under way” and “early clinical evidence appeared strongly favorable.”
114 
  In response to the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s, FDA formally promulgated regulations 
codifying treatment use procedures.  The proposed IND rules issued in 1983 intended to 
expressly authorize the use of a treatment IND or protocol and sought to clarify the 
circumstances under which patients could obtain access, the universe of eligible drugs, and the 
procedures by which such drugs could be obtained.
115 Though narrowly targeted to combat 
AIDS, the treatment use regulations codified the same principles FDA had relied upon 
informally under the Group C protocol with NCI.
116 Broader “compassionate use” and “open 
label” protocols have never been included in formal agency regulations.  
  The 1983 proposals also contained a provision allowing for “emergency procedures” 
where a need for an investigational drug might arise in an “emergency situation that does not 
allow time for compliance with applicable IND submission requirements.”
117 The proposed rules 
permitted FDA to authorize shipment of an investigational drug before submission of an IND, in 
accord with then existing informal agency practice.
118  
                                                 
113 Id. See also FOOD AN DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PATIENT ACCESS TO NEW 
THERAPEUTIC AGENTS FOR PEDIATRIC CANCER (Dec. 2003), available at: 
http://www.fda.gov/oashi/speedaccess.html (follow “Expanded Access” hyperlink) (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008); Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 
Fed. Reg. 26720, 26728 (Jun. 9, 1983) (describing informal access to investigational drugs under 
a physician- or commercial-sponsored IND or protocol where literature reflects that a new drug 
“shows promise for a serious disease”).  
114 Young, supra note 109 at 2267.  
115 Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Product Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. at 
26729.  
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 26730. 
118 Id.   23 
  FDA makes investigational drugs available to desperately ill patients outside of clinical 
investigations under a wide range of programs. Although the public often refers to these 
programs as “compassionate use,” that particular terminology never occurs in FDA 
regulations.
119  Rather, a variety of programs exist all of which might fairly be termed “expanded 
access” but none of which are specifically referred to as such.  The majority of available 
programs are never mentioned in the IND regulations – and even those that are mentioned are 
sometimes largely undefined.
120  The next section of this paper outlines the various methods 
under which FDA currently allows access to investigational drugs.  
 
B. Currently Available Methods of Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment  
  1. Individual Patient IND  
  FDA has long granted “single patient exceptions” for treatment use of an investigational 
drug.
121 Unlike treatment protocols, in which a drug is made available to a group of patients 
suffering from a serious or life-threatening illness, single patient exceptions allow treatment use 
in an individual patient,
122 and may permit an entirely new use of a drug or grant an exception to 
ongoing clinical trials for a patient who failed to meet protocol eligibility requirements.
123  
Single patient exceptions can be obtained as an amendment to an existing IND or as an entirely 
                                                 
119 See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PATIENT ACCESS TO NEW THERAPEUTIC 
AGENTS FOR PEDIATRIC CANCER, supra note 113 at 13. 
120 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 652.  
121 See, e.g., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., BRIEFING DOCUMENT FOR THE ODAC: SINGLE PATIENT 
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new IND.
124  The individual patient IND can be submitted either by a drug manufacturer, 
generally as an amendment to an existing IND, or by an individual physician or clinical 
investigator on behalf of a patient.
125  Where the manufacturer will not sponsor a patient, a 
clinical investigator or physician must obtain the drug from a willing manufacturer and then 
apply directly to FDA for a new IND.
126  The application must include a brief clinical history of 
the patient, a proposed treatment plan, a statement of authorization from a willing drug 
manufacturer or supplier, as well as various other FDA forms.
127  Additionally, the sponsor must 
obtain informed consent from the patient as well as approval from the appropriate Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).
128  FDA may exercise discretion to disallow further enrollment under 
individual patient INDs
129 or, if circumstances occur warranting imposition of a clinical hold 
under FDA regulations
130, FDA may terminate or deny treatment under the IND. 
  The single patient IND does not officially reflected in current FDA regulations. In 1997, 
Congress included § 561(b) in FDAMA in order to address concerns of inconsistent or arbitrary 
implementation of access to single patient INDs in the absence of specific guiding criteria from 
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125 Id.  
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127 See FDA, “Physician Request for a Single Patient IND for Compassionate or Emergency 
Use,” available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/cancer/singlind.htm (last accessed Mar. 31, 2008). 
128 Id. See also FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PATIENT ACCESS TO NEW 
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129 See, e.g., Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F. Supp 2d 717, 78 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Pa. 1999) 
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phase out the program as participants died or voluntarily left). 
130 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.42 (2007). In Smith v. Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), the 
plaintiff, suffering from Hodgkin’s disease, sought a preliminary injunction against FDA 
preventing the agency from terminating his use of Antineoplasatons, an unapproved drug 
improperly administered by his physician outside the provisions of an IND. The court denied the 
injunction, holding that, where a terminally ill patient had failed to make use of available FDA-
approved drugs for his condition, the agency could lawfully disallow a single patient exception 
for an investigational drug, pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 312.42(b)(1)(i).    25 
FDA.
131  Under the statute, any patient, acting through a licensed physician, may seek access to 
an investigational drug directly from the manufacturer if 1) the physician determines that no 
comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy exists to treat the patient’s condition and that the 
probable risk incurred from use of the investigational drug does not outweigh the probable risk 
from the patient’s condition; 2) sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness exists to support 
the use of the investigational drug; 3) use of the drug will not interfere with any clinical 
investigations intended to support marketing approval; and 4) the drug sponsor or clinical 
investigator submits a clinical protocol consistent with the IND regulations.
132 The procedures 
are identical for investigational medical devices.
133 The statute is thus consistent with 
longstanding informal agency practice.  
 
  2. Emergency Use IND  
  As discussed earlier, FDA formally codified emergency use IND procedures in 1987,
134 
but, like single patient exceptions, emergency use procedures date back as far as 1962.
135 Under 
the 1987 regulations, FDA may authorize shipment of an investigational drug for a specified use 
in advance of submission of an IND, where an “emergency situation” does not allow time to 
properly submit an IND pursuant to §§ 312.23 or 312.34.
136  “Emergency use” is defined as “the 
use of a test article on a human subject in a life-threatening situation in which no standard 
acceptable treatment is available, and in which there is not sufficient time to obtain IRB 
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134 52 Fed. Reg. at 8820-8821 (Mar. 19 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.36).  
135 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 653.  
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approval.”
137  Emergency use of a test article may be exempt from prior IRB review, so long as 
the use of the article is reported to the IRB within 5 business days.
138  Under the regulations, any 
subsequent use of the test article must be subject to IRB review,
139 but FDA also acknowledges 
that “it would be inappropriate to deny emergency treatment to a second individual if the only 
obstacle is that the IRB has not had sufficient time to convene a meeting to review the issue.”
140  
Even for an emergency use, an investigator generally must obtain the patient’s informed 
consent before beginning treatment. Treatment may be provided absent informed consent, 
however, where both the investigator and a physician not otherwise participating in the 
investigation certify in writing that 1) the patient is confronted by a life-threatening situation 
necessitating the use of the test article; 2) informed consent cannot be obtained due to an 
inability to communicate with, or obtain legally effective consent from, the patient; 3) time is not 
sufficient to obtain consent from the patient’s legal representative; and 4) no alternative method 
of approved or generally recognized therapy can provide an equal or greater likelihood of saving 
the patient’s life.
141  If the investigator believes that immediate use of the test article is necessary 
to preserve the life of the patient, and that sufficient time does not exist to make any written 
determinations, the investigator must make those determinations within 5 working days of the 
use of the article, and obtain review from a physician not otherwise involved in the 
investigation.
142 
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140 FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, 1998 
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Congress provided specific statutory authority for emergency use INDs in § 561(a) of the 
FD&C Act, inserted in 1997 as part of FDAMA.
143  Under the statute, FDA has discretion 
“under appropriate conditions” to authorize shipment of investigational drugs or devices for 
treatment of a “serious disease or condition in emergency situations.”
144  The statute did not, 
therefore, expand access beyond already existing agency practice.  
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Project 
BioShield Act of 2004
145 and thereby added § 564 to the FD&C Act,
146 allowing FDA to 
authorize use of an unapproved new drug during a declared domestic, military, or national 
security emergency. Since that time, FDA has twice authorized emergency use of the anthrax 
vaccine by military personnel at the request of the Department of Defense.
147 
 
3. Treatment IND  
As discussed above,
148 treatment IND and treatment protocol procedures existed 
informally for many years before FDA proposed formal regulations detailing agency practice in 
1983. The final rules were promulgated in 1987 at the peak of the AIDS crisis and included 
broader provisions than the original proposal.
149 
The treatment IND procedure was intended to “facilitate the availability of promising 
new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug development process as possible” before 
the marketing process beings, and also to gather additional data on the drug’s safety and 
                                                 
143 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb(a). 
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effectiveness.
150  Under FDA regulations, the agency will permit the treatment use of an 
investigational drug under an IND or treatment protocol if 1) the drug is intended to treat a 
serious or immediately life-threatening disease; 2) no comparable or satisfactory alternative 
therapy exists to treat the intended patient population; 3) the drug is under investigation under a 
controlled clinical trial under an IND, or all clinical trials are complete; and 4) the drug sponsor 
is actively pursuing market approval with due diligence.
151  For treatment of a serious disease, 
FDA may deny treatment use of an investigational drug absent sufficient evidence of safety and 
effectiveness.
152  For an immediately life-threatening disease, FDA may deny a request for 
treatment use of the drug only if the scientific evidence, taken as a whole, does not provide a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the drug may be effective for its intended use in its intended 
patient population or that the drug would not expose patients to an unreasonable and significant 
risk of illness or injury.
153  The regulations define “immediately life-threatening” as a stage of a 
disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months 
or in which premature death is likely without treatment.
154 
The final rule further clarified that treatment use of an investigational drug would be 
conditioned upon the drug sponsor or any investigators complying with all FDA regulations 
governing informed consent,
155 IRBs,
156 and any other applicable provisions of Part 312.
157 
The final regulation also grants authority for drug sponsors to charge for investigational 
drugs accessed under a treatment IND – a key factor distinguishing treatment INDs from other 
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informal agency policies such as open label protocols. The regulation permits a drug sponsor to 
charge for access under a treatment IND provided that 1) there is adequate enrollment in any 
ongoing clinical trials under the authorized IND; 2) charging does not constitute commercial 
marketing of a new unapproved drug; 3) the drug is not advertised or otherwise commercially 
promoted; and 4) the sponsor is actively pursuing marketing approval with due diligence.
158  
The provisions on charging go beyond treatment INDs and specify other limitations on 
charging for investigational drugs. FDA has specified that charging for a drug in clinical trials 
under an IND remains impermissible absent prior written approval from the agency upon a 
request from the sponsor detailing why distribution of the drug to test patients should not be 
considered part of the normal cost of doing business.
159  Under the general provision on 
charging, in all cases where a sponsor is permitted to charge for an investigational drug, FDA 
does not allow a sponsor to charge “a price larger than that necessary to recover costs of 
manufacture, research, development, and handling of the investigational drug.”
160  
Congress provided specific statutory authority for treatment INDs in § 561(c) of the 
FD&C Act, inserted in 1997 as part of FDAMA, but notably did not include any provision on 
charging.
161  The statute tracks then existing regulations and did not therefore expand access 
beyond prior agency practice.
162 
 
4. Parallel Track IND  
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In 1990, as a result of continued pressure from the AIDS community
163, the Public Health 
Service and FDA announced a “parallel track mechanism,” an expanded access protocol 
intended exclusively for AIDS/HIV patients.
164  The parallel track IND, while conceptually 
similar to the treatment IND codified several years earlier, was intended to speed approval of 
expanded access protocols “for promising investigational drugs when the evidence for 
effectiveness is less than that generally required for a treatment IND.”
165 As such, drugs would 
become available earlier in the development process, perhaps at the close of Phase I clinical 
trials.
166  Under this policy, promising new drugs would be made available through studies 
without concurrent control groups to monitor drug safety. These studies would be conducted in 
“parallel” with clinical trials under a traditional IND.
167  
Patients eligible to receive investigational drugs under the parallel track mechanism must 
1) have significant HIV-related illness or be at imminent health risk due to HIV-related 
immunodeficiency; and 2) be unable to participate in controlled clinical trials because the patient 
either does not meet the trial entry criteria, is too ill to participate, would suffer undue hardship 
through participation, or the controlled clinical trials are fully enrolled; and 3) the patient cannot 
take the “standard treatment” because it is “contraindicated, cannot be tolerated, or is no longer 
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People With AIDS and other HIV-Related Diseases, 57 Fed. Reg. at 13256.    31 
effective.”
168  Physicians participating in parallel track studies must generally comply with all 
IND requirements. The parallel track studies provide additional data on safety and effectiveness, 
and include monitoring and reporting requirements running concurrent with controlled clinical 
trials.
169  
In order to balance the heightened risk to patients incurred through earlier access to 
parallel track drugs, the policy imposes additional layers of oversight through a multi-agency 
review process.
170  Both the AIDS Research Advisory Council (ARAC) and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) advise the FDA and assist the agency in selecting promising new 
therapies.  Further, the policy calls for the creation of a National Human Subjects Protection 
Review Panel to ensure that all protocols comply with legal and ethical requirements.
171 
Despite intentions to speed access to investigational drugs to large patient populations 
early in the development process, the policy does not provide any unique authorization 
permitting manufacturers or sponsors to charge for access to the drugs. Any sponsor seeking to 
charge for access must therefore comply with 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(1), obtaining written 
authorization to charge from FDA after a full explanation detailing why access to the drugs 
should not be considered part of the normal costs of business.
172 
The parallel track policy is not codified in the Code of Federal Regulations and can only 
be found in the Federal Register.  
 
5. Group C Cancer Treatment IND  
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The Division of Cancer Treatment at NCI plays a major role in the development of new 
anticancer drugs.
173  Since the 1970s, FDA and NCI have collaborated to provide early access to 
promising investigational anticancer drugs to patients in need.
174  Treatment under NCI’s Group 
C designation resembles the treatment IND in that it allows broadened access to promising 
investigational drugs that demonstrate reproducible activity fighting tumors.
175  Under NCI’s 
distribution system, Group C drugs are distributed to qualified physicians who have registered to 
provide the drug to patients under a protocol outside traditional clinical trials.
176  Drugs 
designated under the Group C classification appear in a Master File submitted to FDA.
177  The 
Cancer Treatment Evaluation Program (CTEP) may then submit a formal application to FDA to 
authorize Group C distribution by NCI for the particular indications described in the 
application.
178  Inclusion in a Group C protocol does not constitute a marketing application and 
does not replace FDA’s formal conclusion about a drug’s safety and effectiveness, however, 
drugs are generally only included in a Group C protocol when approval of an NDA is 
“considered likely in the relatively near future.”
179  Inclusion in a Group C protocol generally 
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63, at 655.  
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THERAPEUTIC AGENTS FOR PEDIATRIC CANCER, supra note 105, at 16.  
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entails various safety reporting requirements, and each protocol specifies particular patient 
eligibility, drug use, and reporting mechanisms.
180 
The Group C program is not codified in any regulations. However, the program was 
incorporated in a Memorandum of Understanding between FDA and NCI published in the 
Federal Register.
181  Although NCI continues to designate these drugs as “Group C,” since 1988 
FDA has referred to this protocol as “treatment IND/Group C” and treats applications under the 
protocol as “treatment IND requests, no matter what name they come under,” relying on the 
same criteria used in ordinary treatment IND requests.  NCI pays for the drugs and patients are 
not charged to receive treatment under a Group C IND.
182 
 
6. Open Label IND  
An open label IND or open label protocol is another pathway to access outside of 
controlled clinical trials. Two types of open protocols exist. First, an open label protocol may be 
used under a wide variety of circumstances to treat seriously ill patients.  The protocol allows 
patients to receive the drug while some safety information is collected, but the study has no 
control group.
183  This mechanism is similar to a single patient IND, but allows FDA to process 
requests for multiple individuals through a single general request from the drug sponsor.
184 
Similar to other FDA policies, open label protocols may be appropriate where a licensed 
physician has determined that an unapproved drug may benefit a particular patient, no other 
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181 See Anticancer Drug Development: Memorandum of Understanding with the National 
Institutes of Health, 44 Fed. Reg. at 25510.  
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alternative therapies are available, and sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness exists to 
support use of the investigational product.
185  Unlike the treatment IND, the sponsor must agree 
to provide the drug free of charge, absent specific approval from FDA to charge under 21 C.F.R. 
§ 312.7(d)(1).  
The other type of open label protocol arises when a placebo-controlled clinical trial has 
been completed. Sometimes referred to as an “open label extension,” this mechanism allows 
continued treatment after a clinical trial, and permits patients who had received a placebo under 
the trial to receive the unapproved drug.
186 
Open label INDs date back to 1962 but have never been codified in any FDA 
regulations.
187  Thousands of patients have received treatment under this mechanism over the 
years under large-scale open label protocols.
188  Under both types of open label protocols, the 
sponsor must record and report safety data to FDA as part of the NDA.
189 
 
7. Compassionate Use IND  
Although the lay public frequently refers to various expanded access programs as 
“compassionate use,” the term itself is not defined in any FDA regulations or policies.
190 
Although broad and undefined, the term has nonetheless appeared in varying contexts at FDA 
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187 HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63, at 656..  
188 See Clinical Trial Subjects: Adequate FDA Protections?, supra note 183, at 60-61 (Statement 
of Dr. Michael A. Friedman, MD) (describing large scale protocols for anti-retroviral drugs in 
which tens of thousands of patients were enrolled).  
189 See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 63 at 656.  
190 See Clinical Trial Subjects: Adequate FDA Protections?, supra note 183, at 57 (Statement of 
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since 1962.
191  While the term “compassionate IND” sometimes appears to be synonymous with 
an “open protocol,”
192 other sources indicate that a “compassionate use study” existed informally 
within FDA as early as 1968, conducted under either an existing or separate IND.
193 Such studies 
were not formal controlled trials, and permitted use of an investigational drug by either a single 
patient or a small group, or “for an early exploration of a novel idea.”
194  
 
8. Orphan Drug IND  
Prior to 1983, when Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act,
195 pharmaceutical 
manufacturers had few incentives to develop drugs for diseases affecting small patient 
populations.
196  Rational business decisions encouraged development of pharmaceuticals 
intended to treat a large number of patients, for which mass marketing would overcome the high 
costs of research and development.
197  Often, even when a compound was thought to be useful in 
combating rare diseases, the high costs of bringing the drug to market would result in an “orphan 
drug,” lacking any sponsor willing to conduct the required animal and human clinical trials.
198 
Even whern sponsors were willing to invest in the necessary research, small patient populations 
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might not support all the necessary FDA testing.
199  Accordingly, orphan drugs before 1983 
frequently found themselves on a “continuing IND status that the FDA and the sponsor tacitly 
agreed would probably be permanent.”
200  
The Orphan Drug Act added § 528 to the FD&C Act
201 in 1983, requiring FDA to 
“encourage the sponsor” of any designated orphan drug to design protocols for clinical 
investigations that will include “persons…who need the drug to treat the disease or condition and 
who cannot be satisfactorily treated by available alternative drugs.”
202  Reflecting agency 
practice since 1983, FDA has promulgated regulations allowing treatment use of designated 
investigational orphan drugs under a treatment IND pursuant to 21  C.F.R. § 312.34.
203  
 
9. Tropical Drug IND  
Until relatively recently, FDA rarely approved NDAs for exclusively “tropical” diseases, 
arguing that no need for such drugs existed in the United States.
204 Nonetheless, FDA has long 
permitted clinical investigations for drugs treating tropical diseases and thus, like the orphan 
drug INDs, a tropical drug IND often existed indefinitely. Today, increased international travel 
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10. Special Exception IND  
When a patient is ineligible to participate in a controlled clinical trial of an investigational 
drug, a willing sponsor may request that FDA make a special exception from the IND protocol 
and allow a particular patient to receive treatment.
206  This special exception IND does not 
appear in any FDA regulation or guidance.
207  Because the patient is a special exception falling 
outside the criteria of any investigations, data from the patient’s experience with the 
investigational treatment are not included in the reported study results.
208 
Another form of “special exception” serves as a kind of single patient IND for Group C 
drugs.
209  Under this mechanism, clinical investigators may obtain investigational anticancer 
treatments directly through NCI, rather than filing a new IND with FDA.  Drugs available under 
NCI’s special exception mechanism must have succeeded in Phase I trials and NCI requires 
some evidence of efficacy before the drug is made available to patients.
210  Patients receiving 
treatment through the special exception policy must be ineligible for any ongoing clinical 
investigations and must have availed themselves of any currently available standard treatment 
before receiving the investigational drug.  
 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: PRESSURE TO EXPAND ACCESS  
Despite the numerous regulatory mechanisms for expanded access described in the 
previous section, patient advocacy groups have consistently criticized the reality of access under 
FDA’s policies and called for increased access to investigational treatments.  
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The treatment IND regulations promulgated in the 1980s, which FDA now proposes to 
revise, have been criticized for failing to significantly expand access.
211  Although initially 
relatively successful – by 1994, more than thirty experimental drugs and biologicals were made 
available under treatment IND provisions
212—access under these regulations has largely fallen 
into disuse.
213  Practical limitations often prevent access because drugs provided under a 
treatment IND are generally considered “experimental” and frequently are not covered by third 
party insurers or by Medicare and Medicaid.
214  Additionally, the requirement that a drug 
sponsor actively pursue marketing approval with “due diligence”
215 can bar access to a drug 
when a manufacturer decides not to pursue marketing approval even though it has demonstrated 
proof of both safety and effectiveness.
216  Other critics contend that the treatment IND provisions 
have not been administered in a manner consistent with their original purpose. Despite the fact 
that the regulations advocate availability of promising drugs as early as Phase 2, FDA generally 
grants IND protocols only when approval is imminent and clinical trials are nearly complete.
217 
FDA’s recently proposed rules arise amidst newly increased pressure for reform from a 
number of patient advocacy organizations and their allies. Some critics contend that FDA’s lack 
of specific criteria for obtaining expanded access has led to disparate access to investigational 
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therapies,
218 while others contend that a lack of transparency has limited awareness of expanded 
access availability primarily to physicians and patients in academic medical centers.
219  One 
prominent patient advocacy group, the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs (Abigail Alliance), alleged that FDA’s policies restricting the rights of terminally ill 
patients to purchase investigational drugs violated a fundamental right of access under the 
Constitution.
220  Some critics have argued that FDA policies limiting the ability of drug sponsors 
to charge patients for expanded access deters industry participation in expanded access 
programs,
221 while others maintain that manufacturers should be entirely barred from charging 
for expanded access.
222  These criticisms have been incorporated variously in citizen petitions, 
proposed federal legislation, and a lawsuit against FDA.  
Although the patient advocacy movement first grew out of responses to the AIDS 
epidemic, the past decade has seen an explosion in advocacy groups on behalf of cancer 
patients.
223  Patients suffering from serious or life-threatening diseases have new access to 
information about investigational drugs through the Internet, and these patients are able to obtain 
detailed information about expanded access programs and clinical trials.
224  Yet, for a variety of 
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reasons, the number of expanded access programs available to cancer patients remains quite 
small.
225  Modern cancer treatments are rarely “pill in a bottle” drugs and frequently involve 
complicated and personalized biotechnology.
226  Small biotechnology firms on the forefront of 
cancer research often face serious capacity constraints and cannot afford to provide drugs outside 
of the expensive clinical trials necessary to gain marketing approval.
227  While FDA expanded 
access regulations allow distribution outside of clinical investigations, the practical reality of 
satisfying FDA’s clinical trial requirements often creates insurmountable barriers to expanded 
access. As a result, cancer advocacy groups, historically lacking the political clout achieved by 
AIDS activists in the 1980s, have ramped up efforts to increase industry participation in 
expanded access programs and achieve policy reform at FDA.
228 
In June 2003, the Abigail Alliance, together with the Washington Legal Foundation 
(WLF), submitted a citizen petition to FDA urging the agency to revise the IND regulations 
codified in part 312 of the Code of Federal Regulations and establish a three tiered approval 
mechanism to speed terminally ill patients’ access to promising investigational therapies.
229 
Arguing that there is a “different risk-benefit tradeoff facing patients who are terminally ill and 
have no other treatment options” than that facing ordinary patients
230, the Abigail Alliance 
proposal asked FDA to grant “Tier 1 Initial Approval” for “promising drugs, biologics, and 
                                                                                                                                                            
for patient advocacy group detailing information for terminally ill patients about researching 
investigational therapies, finding clinical trials or expanded access programs, and navigating the 
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devices (“drugs”) intended to treat life-threatening diseases with unmet needs.”
231  Under the 
proposal, FDA would have authority to grant Tier 1 approval “based on the results of a Phase 1 
trial demonstrating a safety profile sufficient” to support Phase 2 or Phase 3 clinical trials and 
“initial evidence of effectiveness based on case-history data from a small number of patients.”
232  
In order to safeguard patients, drugs made available under Tier 1 Initial Approval would be 
limited by various marketing restrictions, unique labeling requirements, and informed consent 
requirements. Further, in order to protect and encourage further investigation for a drug’s safety 
and effectiveness, Initial Approval would be contingent on the manufacturer’s continued pursuit 
of higher tiers of approval and sponsors would only be able to provide the drug to patients found 
ineligible for or denied access to ongoing clinical trials.
233  Abigail Alliance asked FDA to revise 
the treatment IND regulations in order to specifically account for the “risk of illness, injury, or 
death from [a life-threatening or serious] disease in the absence of the drug” when determining 
whether or not to make treatment use available.
234 
FDA never responded to the Abigail Alliance petition, but did respond to earlier 
submissions, noting that the Alliance proposal “raised several important questions about 
expanded access that…deserve further consideration” and expressing doubt that the Alliance 
proposal “would have the intended desirable effects for patients.”
235  Agency officials found a 
“significant range of opinion within the patient and provider communities” regarding necessary 
premarketing standards, noting that others within the cancer patient community have suggested 
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that “FDA needs a strong clinical trial system as the basis of the approval of cancer drugs….”
236 
On the grounds that the Abigail Alliance proposal would not provide sufficient statistical 
information to determine “a reasonably precise estimate of response rate” or “enough  experience 
to detect serious adverse effects,”
237 FDA concluded that the Alliance proposal failed to strike an 
appropriate balance between the potential benefits of early access to investigational drugs and 
the risks of marketing drugs without knowledge of potential clinical benefits or toxicity.
238 
Lacking a formal response to the petition, the Abigail Alliance and WLF filed a lawsuit 
against FDA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that FDA’s 
policy of prohibiting the sale of investigational drugs showing early evidence of safety and 
effectiveness to terminally ill patients violated the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
guarantee against deprivation of life without due process of law.
239  The district court dismissed 
the case for failure to state a cause of action, holding that “there is no constitutional right of 
access to unapproved drugs.”
240  A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that “where there are no 
alternative government-approved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult 
patient’s informed access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs determined by the 
FDA after Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants protection 
under the Due Process Clause.”
241 The majority applied the Supreme Court’s test for substantive 
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due process claims enumerated in Washington v. Glucksberg,
242 in which courts, after carefully 
stating the asserted liberty interest, must inquire whether the interest at issue is objectively 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty[.]”
243  The majority evaluated the history of new drug regulation in light of “our Nation’s 
history, legal traditions, and practices”
244 and found that the history of governmental regulation 
of access to new drugs was relatively recent and that “[f]or over half of our Nation’s 
history…until the enactment of the 1906 Act, a person could obtain access to any new drug 
without any government interference whatsoever.”
245  The appellate panel therefore found the 
Abigail Alliance’s carefully crafted liberty interest constituted a fundamental right, subjecting 
any governmental infringement against this liberty interest to strict scrutiny. Because the district 
court never reached the issue of whether the FDA’s policy violated this fundamental liberty 
interest, the panel remanded the case back to the district court to determine “whether the FDA’s 
policy barring access to post-Phase I investigational new drugs by terminally ill patients is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
246 
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The panel’s ruling, viewed as a major victory for cancer patient advocates, undoubtedly 
spurred FDA’s decision to revise the IND regulations on its own terms.
247 The ruling itself, 
however, would prove to be short-lived. FDA petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en banc 
and the full D.C. Circuit reversed the panel’s decision.
248  On rehearing, the majority framed the 
Alliance’s claimed liberty interest as a “fundamental right of access for the terminally ill to 
experimental drugs,”
249 a wider interest than the one stated by the three-judge panel in Abigail I. 
Further, the Abigail II court engaged in a detailed and lengthy analysis of historical regulation of 
drugs, finding traditions dating back as far as 15
th century England and colonial times.
250 
Concluding that the historical regulation of drugs affirmatively showed a longstanding tradition 
of governmental control over access to drugs, and discarding a number of common law doctrines 
advanced by the Abigail Alliance, the court held that the “Alliance’s claimed right is not 
fundamental [and therefore] subject only to rational basis scrutiny,”
251 under which the Alliance 
must show that FDA’s policy bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
252 
Because restricting access to investigational drugs is rationally related to the agency’s interest in 
protecting all patients from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects, the court 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Abigail II court emphasized that the Alliance’s claims 
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could all “be aired in the democratic branches, without injecting the courts into unknown 
questions of science and medicine” and that the court’s holding would ensure that the “debate 
among the Alliance, the FDA, the scientific and medical communities, and the public may 
continue through the democratic process.”
253 
The Abigail Alliance has also attempted to change FDA policies through federal 
legislation.  In 2005, Sens. Sam Brownback and Tom Inhofe introduced legislation during the 
that would create a new approval process for access to investigational drugs for treatment use, 
building on the three tiered approval mechanism set forth in the 2003 Abigail Alliance citizen 
petition.
254  
The Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act (ACCESS Act) 
began by stating a series of congressional findings, including that “[t]he necessity of placebo 
controlled studies has been questioned on both scientific and medical grounds for seriously ill 
patients”
255 and  that “[s]eriously ill patients have a right to access available investigational 
drugs, biological products, and devices.”
256  Like the citizen petition, the ACCESS Act sought to 
create a “Tier 1 approval” process for drugs with available Phase I safety data and preliminary 
evidence of effectiveness for treatment of a serious or life-threatening disease.
257  The Act 
specifically denotes that such evidence can be based on “uncontrolled data such as case histories, 
information about the pharmacological mechanism of action, data from animal and computer 
models” and other information not tied to traditional placebo-controlled clinical investigations.
258 
                                                 
253 Id. at 713.  
254 Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act (ACCESS Act), S. 1956 
& H.R. 6303, 109th Cong. (2005).  
255 Id. at § 2(1). 
256 Id. at § 2(4). 
257 Id. at § 3(b)(1)(A). (i)-(ii).  
258 Id. at § 3(b)(1)(A)(ii).    46 
A sponsor seeking Tier 1 approval would need to provide assurance that it would continue 
clinical investigations designed to obtain Tier 3 full approval.
259 FDA would then either approve 
the application or refer the application to an Accelerated Approval Advisory Committee.
260  
In order to obtain access to the drug, patients would provide written informed consent, 
waive any right to sue the drug manufacturer or sponsor, and consent to provide data to the 
manufacturer about the patient and the patient’s use of the treatment.
261  In an effort to protect 
clinical trials while preserving the right of patients to receive investigational treatments, the Act 
would require FDA to prohibit placebo-only or no-treatment-only concurrent controls in any 
clinical investigation of treatments for serious or life-threatening diseases for which no 
reasonably effective alternatives exist.
262 
The bill was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, but the 
109
th Congress ended without any action taken on the legislation. The bill has not since been 
revived.  
In March 2006, the National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship (NCCS) and the 
American Society for Clinical Oncology (ASCO) filed a separate citizen petition with FDA.
263 
The NCCS petition requested that the agency issue guidance clarifying the circumstances under 
which expanded access programs may be initiated, recognizing that FDA’s regulations provide 
“ample authority for the conduct of expanded access programs” but noting that “there is 
uncertainty about the procedures and standards applicable to such programs.”
264  The petition 
emphasized that expanded access programs should not interfere with ongoing clinical trials or 
                                                 
259 Id. at § 3(b)(1)(A)(iii).  
260 Id. at § 3(b)(2).  
261 Id. at § 3(b)(5)(B). 
262 Id. at § 4.  
263 NCCS Citizen Pet., supra note 218.  
264 Id. at 1.    47 
delay marketing approval, and recommended FDA adopt a systematic approach to providing 
access.
265  With regard to single patient access, NCCS recommended that FDA design standard 
protocols and model consent forms in order to ease the burden on sponsors and physicians, who, 
under current regulations, must process each application individually.
266  The petition also sought 
to clarify the criteria FDA would use in order to determine when expanded access could be made 
available prior to Phase 3 or, in unusual circumstances, prior to Phase 2. The petition suggested 
that FDA should rely on a number of different variables, such as the nature and strength of the 
evidence of safety and effectiveness, unmet patient need, the likelihood and imminence of 
marketing approval, and the likely availability of the drug itself.
267  In evaluating effectiveness, 
the petition urged FDA to focus on the quality of responses to a drug – e.g., whether some 
responses appear particularly durable or are accompanied by significant relief of cancer-related 
symptoms – rather than pure statistical endpoints.
268 The proposal also noted that many 
manufacturers are limited by capacity constraints, and urged FDA to permit greater access to 
drugs where “the agent in question is a small molecule with relatively straightforward 
manufacturing process and cost” as opposed to a “more complex biological product[.]”
269  In  
contrast to the position taken by the Abigail Alliance, the NCCS petition argued that FDA should 
“urge sponsors to forgo cost recovery and provide drugs without charge to patients in expanded 
access,” noting that this has been “[t]he custom among sponsors” and would “appear to be the 
preferable practice by far.”
270 FDA has not responded to the NCCS petition.  
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V. FDA’S PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
On December 14, 2006, FDA proposed two new regulations in the Federal Register 
addressing expanded access to investigational drugs for treatment use and charging for 
investigational drugs.
271  The expanded access proposal would amend FDA’s IND regulations by 
replacing the current sections on treatment use, revising regulations on clinical holds, and adding 
a new “Subpart I” on expanded access.
272  The charging proposal would remove the current 
provisions in § 312.7(d) and create a new § 312.8 describing general requirements for charging 
for investigational drugs, specific requirements for charging for investigational drugs in a clinical 
trial, charging for investigational drugs under the new Subpart I, and requirements for 
determining what costs may be recovered when charging for an investigational drug.
273 
 
A. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs  
According to FDA, the proposed expanded access regulations are intended to address the 
concerns that motivated congress to include § 561 of the FD&C Act in the 1997 FDAMA 
legislation. Specifically, the rules are intended to address concerns about inconsistent application 
of access policies and inequitable access for patients outside of academic medical research 
centers.
274  The proposed regulations are intended to detail and clarify the various available 
procedures as well as the criteria, submission requirements, and safeguards employed for each 
method of access.
275  FDA maintains that increased awareness of available expanded access 
problems will make investigational drugs more widely available “in appropriate situations,” and 
                                                 
271 Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1; Proposed Rules for Charging, supra note 2.  
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273 Proposed Rules for Charging, supra note 2, at 75171.  
274 Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75149.  
275 Id.   49 
argues that clearly articulated administrative procedures will ease the burden on sponsors and 
physicians making investigational drugs available for individual patient use and “result in more 
patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or conditions getting the earliest 
possible access” to investigational therapies.
276  
The proposed regulations establish specific criteria for all expanded access uses and 
would permit expanded access for individual patients, intermediate-size patient populations, and 
larger patient populations.  
 
1. Requirements for All Expanded Access Use  
In all circumstances where expanded access use is permitted, FDA would require that the 
patient or patients seeking treatment have a “serious or immediately-life threatening disease or 
condition” with no comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy.
277  FDA would need to 
determine that the potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of treatment use, and that 
                                                 
276 Id. at 75149-75150.  
277 Id. at 75150-75151. Because of “the difficulty of specifically describing the criteria that 
characterizes a ‘serious disease or condition,’” the proposal does not provide a definition but 
rather points to other agency documents in which the term is described. See FDA Guidance for 
Industry, Fast Track Drug Development Programs – Designation, Development, and Application 
Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 64093 (Nov. 18, 1998). FDA suggests that the term applies to conditions 
that have “an important effect on functioning,” such as stroke, schizophrenia, or rheumatoid 
arthritis, or have important effects on “other aspects of quality of life,” such as chronic 
depression or seizures. See Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1 at 75151. The 
proposed rules define “immediately life-threatening” as “a stage of disease in which there is 
reasonable likelihood that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature 
death is likely without early treatment.” Id. at 75166; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(b). FDA 
states that a “lack of comparable or satisfactory therapeutic alternatives” ordinarily means either 
no available therapy to treat the patient’s condition exists, or that the patient has tried available 
therapies and either failed to respond adequately or proved intolerant to them. Generally, 
“available” refers only to FDA-approved products labeled for treatment for the patient’s disease 
or condition, but in some cases could refer either to treatment not regulated by FDA, such as 
surgery, or off-label use supported by “compelling literature evidence.” Id. at 75151. See also 
FDA Guidance for Industry, Available Therapy, 69 Fed. Reg. 44039 (July 23, 2004).    50 
any potential risks are not “unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition” at issue.
278 
Lastly, expanded access use could not interfere with clinical investigations that might support 
full marketing approval, or “otherwise compromise the potential development” of the 
investigational drug.
279 
Under the proposal, the specific amount of evidence necessary to show safety and 
effectiveness for expanded access use varies depending on the type of expanded access program 
under which the drug is provided, and is described separately in those provisions. In general, the 
amount of evidence necessary would depend on the size of the patient population to be treated 
and relative seriousness of the disease or condition for which treatment is sought.
280 Thus, 
treatment of a large number of patients under a treatment IND would require greater evidence 
than treatment for only a small number of patients, while intermediate-size patient populations 
would fall somewhere in between.
281  In addition to the size of the patient population, FDA 
would consider authorizing expanded access on less data based on the seriousness of the disease. 
For example, the proposal states that, for treatment of an individual patient facing an 
immediately life-threatening condition, the agency would “ordinarily” require completed Phase I 
safety testing of the drug along with “preliminary evidence suggesting possible effectiveness” to 
support expanded access use.
282  The proposal suggests that in some cases access could be based 
on “preclinical data or on the mechanism of action.”
283  Where larger patient populations are 
                                                 
278 Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75151; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 
312.305(a)(2).  
279 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3).  
280 Id.   
281 Id. The new proposal continues the use of the terms “treatment IND” or “treatment protocol” 
for expanded access programs making investigational drugs available to large patient populations 
for treatment use.  
282 Id.  
283 Id.    51 
involved, FDA would ordinarily require data from Phase 3 clinical trials to support expanded 
access use under a treatment IND or treatment protocol where the condition is serious but not 
“imminently life threatening,” and “might permit” treatment for an “immediately life-
threatening” disease based on “compelling data from phase 2 trials.”
284 
As under current regulations, the proposed rule would require submission of a new IND 
or an amendment to an existing IND before patients obtain access to an investigational 
treatment,
285 and describes the necessary contents of the application.
286  The proposal sets forth 
the requirements and responsibilities of sponsors and investigators,
287 and provides that 
expanded access would be allowed to begin thirty days after receipt of a newly submitted IND, 
or upon earlier notification from FDA.  Expanded access under an existing IND would ordinarily 
begin immediately upon submission of the expanded access protocol.
288 
 
2. Expanded Access for Individual Patients 
In addition to the criteria applicable to all expanded access uses, the proposed regulations 
detail specific criteria for different expanded access uses. Proposed § 312.310 describes the 
requirements for individual patient expanded access. Under the rule, an individual patient may be 
permitted to obtain expanded access use of an investigational drug through a licensed physician 
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285 Id. at 75151-75152; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(b)(1).  
286 Id. at 75152; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(b)(2)-(3).  
287 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(c).  
288 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(d). The proposed rule contains two exceptions about when 
access may begin. First, proposed § 312.305(d)(2)(i) provides that treatment of an individual 
patient in an emergency situation may begin upon authorization by a FDA reviewing official. 
Second, proposed § 312.305(d)(2)(ii) requires a 30-day wait to begin any Treatment IND or 
treatment protocol use even if an existing IND is on file with FDA, in order to build in sufficient 
time for the agency to review proposed expanded access use that can potentially affect large 
numbers of patients.   52 
if the physician determines that the probable risk to the patient from use of the drug is not greater 
than the probable risk from the relevant disease or condition,
289 and FDA determines that the 
patient was unable to receive access through another type of IND, such as a clinical trial.
290 
Either the drug sponsor or the patient’s licensed physician can apply for expanded access if an 
IND is currently effective.
291  A drug sponsor would be required to submit a protocol under an 
existing IND, whereas a physician would file a new IND under a “right of reference” to the 
sponsor’s IND along with additional specific information about the patient.
292  The proposed 
rules would limit expanded access treatment of an individual patient to a “single course of 
therapy for a specified duration” absent FDA authorization for multiple courses or chronic 
therapy.
293  Consistent with current regulations, the proposed rules set out emergency procedures 
for expanded access use for individual patients.
294  In an emergency situation requiring treatment 
of an individual patient prior to filing an IND, FDA could authorize the expanded access use by 
telephone, facsimile, or other electronic communication.
295  The drug sponsor or physician 
would thereafter be obligated to file a written submission complying with all the requirements of 
proposed § 312.305 and § 312.310 within five working days of FDA’s authorization.
296 
                                                 
289 Id. at 75153; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(a)(1). 
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291 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(b).  
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293 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(c). The rules further allow FDA to require a sponsor to 
monitor extended individual patient expanded access use, and would require the sponsor or 
physician to provide FDA with a written summary of the results of the treatment use, including 
any unexpected adverse events. Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(c)(2)-(3). A “significant 
number of similar requests” for individual access – such as, perhaps, ten requests for the same 
treatment within six months --  may cause FDA to request the sponsor to submit a protocol under 
§ 312.315 or § 312.320 of the proposed rules.  
294 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(d).  
295 Id. at 75154; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(d)(1). 
296 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(d)(2). FDA insists that such emergency use will be limited 
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3. Expanded Access for Intermediate Size Patient Populations  
FDA has also proposed rules governing “intermediate-size patient populations,” intended 
to include groups of patients “smaller than those typical in treatment INDs or treatment 
protocols.”
297  The agency could ask a sponsor to provide access under this section where the 
agency has received a “significant number of requests” for individual patient access.
298  FDA 
proposes that this type of expanded access would apply where a drug is not being developed for 
marketing but nonetheless represents the only promising therapy for a rare disease or 
condition,
299 where a drug is being developed but patients ineligible to participate in clinical 
investigations seek access to the drug,
300 or where an approved drug is no longer marketed.
301 
The specific criteria described in this section would apply to expanded access use for 
intermediate-size patient populations in addition to the criteria applicable to all expanded access 
uses.
302  In order to permit expanded access under this section, FDA would first need to find 
“enough evidence that the drug is safe at the dose and duration proposed for expanded access use 
                                                                                                                                                            
that FDA’s experience with emergency use indicates that a follow-up written submission is 
rarely provided after emergency use is obtained. Id.  
297 Id; proposed 21 C.F.R. §  312.315.  
298 Id.  
299 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(1). 
300 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(2). Patients may not be eligible for clinical trials 
because they have a different disease or stage of disease from the one under investigation, or do 
not otherwise meet particular enrollment criteria; because enrollment in the trial is closed; or 
because the trial site is too geographically inaccessible for the patient. Id.  
301 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(3). An approved drug might cease to be marketed for 
safety reasons or for failure to meet conditions of the drug approval, 21 C.F.R § 312.315(a)(3)(i), 
or because the drug contains the same active moiety as an approved drug product that is 
unavailable for marketing, 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(3)(ii). Where the drug is not available due to 
safety concerns, the rules provide that a subset of patients may exist for whom the benefits of 
treatment use outweigh the potential safety risks. See Proposed Rules for Expanded Access, 
supra note 1, at 75154, proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(a)(3)(i).  
302 Proposed Rules to Expand Access,, supra note 1, at 75154.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(b).    54 
to justify a clinical trial of the drug” for the number of patients expected to receive expanded 
access use of the drug,
303 and “at least preliminary clinical evidence of effectiveness” or of a 
“plausible pharmacological effect” of the drug to make expanded access use a “reasonable 
therapeutic option” for the proposed patient population.
304 
Intermediate patient-size IND applications would need to specify whether or not the drug 
is being developed and would describe the population to be treated.
305  If the drug is not being 
actively developed, the sponsor must fully explain why the drug cannot be developed and what 
circumstances would be necessary for development.
306  If the drug is not being investigated in 
clinical trials, the sponsor must explain why patients cannot be enrolled in a trial, and what 
circumstances would be necessary to conduct clinical trials in the relevant patients.
307  FDA 
would annually review expanded access programs for intermediate-size populations in order to 
determine whether continued use is appropriate.
308  The drug sponsor would be responsible for 
monitoring expanded access protocols in order to ensure that physicians comply both with the 
protocol and all regulations applicable to investigators.
309 
                                                 
303 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(b)(1). As in the traditional model of drug development, 
FDA requires more data about an investigational treatment as the number of patients exposed to 
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304 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(b)(2).  
305 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(c)(1).  
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marketing. Proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(d)(1)(i). If the drug is being actively developed, FDA 
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protocol under proposed § 312.320. Proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.315(d)(1)(iii).  
309 Proposed Rules for Expanded Access, supra note 1 at 75155; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 
312.315(d)(2).    55 
 
3. Expanded Access Under a Treatment IND or Treatment Protocol 
A treatment IND or treatment protocol would be used for widespread treatment use of an 
investigational drug and would likely apply to populations in excess of one hundred patients.
310  
The proposed rules largely mirror the mechanisms currently available under §§ 312.34 and 
312.35 of the C.F.R.
311  Consistent with current treatment IND regulations, the proposed rules 
would permit access under a treatment IND or protocol only if the drug is being investigated 
under controlled clinical trials under an IND intended to support marketing approval for the 
proposed treatment use
312 or all clinical trials for the drug are complete.
313  As under current 
regulations, the sponsor would need to be “actively pursuing marketing approval” for the 
proposed expanded access use with due diligence.
314  
To authorize treatment of a “serious disease or condition,” the proposed rule would 
require “sufficient clinical evidence of safety and effectiveness” to support the proposed use, 
ordinarily consisting of data from phase 3 trials, but for which compelling data from completed 
phase 2 trials could suffice.
315  For an “immediately life-threatening” disease or condition, 
available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, would need to provide a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the investigational drug may be effective for the proposed use and would not 
expose patients to an “unreasonable and significant risk” of harm. The proposal suggests this 
                                                 
310 See id. at 75154.  
311 See supra, notes 150 to 154 and accompanying text.  
312 Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75155; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 
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data would ordinarily consist of clinical data from Phase 3 or Phase 2 trials, but could potentially 
be based on “more preliminary clinical evidence.”
316  
In addition to specific submission requirements under this section
317, the proposed rules 
would also obligate the drug sponsor to monitor the treatment protocol and ensure that all 
physicians administering treatment comply with both the protocol and all applicable 
regulations.
318 
The preamble to the proposed rule addresses FDA’s concerns that drug sponsors may use 
“open-label safety studies” to make investigational drugs available to seriously ill patients 
instead of the treatment IND procedures.
319  While the goal of an open-label safety study is to 
“better characterize the safety of a drug late in its development,” many such studies bear 
characteristics resembling treatment INDs.  FDA states that the agency would consider 
reclassifying some open label studies as a treatment protocol, particularly where a study provides 
“broad access to an investigational drug in the later stages of development, but lacks planned, 
systematic data collection and a design appropriate to evaluation of a safety issue[.]”
320  FDA 
insists such studies should fall under the treatment IND procedure in order to ensure a “more 
formal review process” that will specifically evaluate the impact of the expanded access 
treatment on both enrollment in clinical trials and the overall progress of the drug’s 
development.
321 FDA further notes that the continuation phase of a clinical trial, in which 
participants in the trial who received a placebo are permitted access to the investigational drug, 
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B. Charging for Investigational Drugs 
FDA has also proposed new regulations governing charging for investigational drugs.
323  
The agency has advanced three principal reasons for revising the charging regulations. First, 
FDA notes that the current regulations in § 312.7(d) failed to anticipate the high number of 
requests to charge for use of a third party’s approved drug in a clinical trial, rather than a 
sponsor’s own investigational drug.
324  Second, the current charging regulations only specify 
conditions to charge under a treatment IND or treatment protocol; the new rules would include 
authority to charge for the two “new” categories of expanded access in proposed section 
312.300.
325  Last, FDA maintains that the current charging rule lacks specificity regarding the 
types of costs that can be recovered. The agency therefore intends to provide clearer guidance to 




1. General Requirements for Charging  
Under all circumstances in which a sponsor intends to charge for access to an 
investigational drug – either in a clinical trial or as part of an expanded access program – FDA 
                                                 
322 Id. at 75155-75156.  
323 See Proposed Rules for Charging, supra note 2.  
324 Id. at 75169. Drug sponsors might to charge for a third party’s approved drug for use as an 
active control, or in combination with the sponsor’s drug. Third parties conducting off-label use 
studies, or comparing the effectiveness of various drugs, might also seek to charge for drugs 
during clinical investigations. 
325 Id.  
326 Id. at 75169-75170.    58 
would require the sponsor to comply with specific requirements for the relevant type of use, 
provide justification that the amount to be charged reflects only costs for which recovery is 
permissible, and obtain prior written authorization from the agency.
327  
 
2. Charging in a Clinical Trial 
The preamble to the proposed rule specifies that FDA will require “exceptional 
circumstances” in order to justify charging in a clinical trial because the costs of an 
investigational drug in trial should be considered an anticipated cost of development.
328  Under 
the proposal, a sponsor that seeks to charge for its own drug in a clinical trial would need to 
provide evidence that the potential benefit of the drug under investigation would represent a 
significant therapeutic advantage over available products, demonstrate that the data to be 
obtained in the clinical trial are essential to establishing the drug’s safety and effectiveness for 
initial approval (or to support a “significant change in the labeling” of an approved drug), and 
demonstrate that the extraordinary cost of the drug requires charging in order to continue clinical 
development of the drug.
329  
FDA has articulated different criteria, however, where a drug sponsor seeks to charge for 
an approved drug obtained from another entity for use in clinical testing. FDA intends to 
establish a lower threshold requirement where a sponsor seeks to use another entity’s approved 
drug as an active control, or in combination with another drug, during clinical investigations. 
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authorization from FDA in order to charge changes the current treatment IND authorization, 
under which a sponsor  could charge automatically 30 days after submission. FDA intends to 
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328 Id. at 75170.  
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Noting ethical concerns about the use of a placebo control in patients during some clinical 
investigations, and that enrolled patients would otherwise receive the approved drug were they 
not participating in the clinical trial,
330 FDA would require the sponsor to demonstrate only that 
the trial is adequately designed to evaluate the safety or effectiveness of the sponsor’s drug and 
that the drug is not being provided to the sponsor free of charge.
331  The agency would apply 
additional criteria to a clinical trial sponsor who seeks to charge for an approved drug obtained 
from another entity in order to evaluate the drug’s safety and effectiveness for an off-label use or 
to obtain additional safety information.
332 
 
3. Charging For Expanded Access for Treatment Use  
The proposed regulations would also replace the current regulation on charging for 
investigational drugs through a treatment IND or protocol. The new “subpart I” categories of 
treatment – expanded access for individual patients and expanded access for intermediate-size 
patient populations – would be included under the new regulation. The new rule would require 
any sponsor seeking to charge for a drug available under any of the subpart I categories of 
expanded access to “provide reasonable assurance” that charging will not interfere with 
developing the drug for marketing approval.
333 
                                                 
330 Id. at 75171.  
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The agency proposes to require additional criteria before approving requests to charge for 
expanded access to drugs made available under a treatment IND or treatment protocol.
334  FDA 
expresses concern that treatment INDs, unlike individual patient access or intermediate-size 
patient populations, carry particularly strong risks of interference with drug development for 
marketing approval.   FDA has expressed concern that large enrollments in treatment protocols 
could significantly affect enrollment in clinical trials intended to gauge safety and 
effectiveness.
335  Thus, the new regulations would require treatment IND sponsors to provide 
adequate evidence of sufficient enrollment in clinical trials so as to reasonably allow FDA to 
determine that trials will be completed as planned,
336 as well as evidence of “adequate progress 
in the development of the drug for marketing approval.”
337  Sponsors would also be required to 
submit information included in their “general investigational plan”
338 specifying all drug 
development milestones expected to occur in the coming year.
339 
Authorization to charge would be limited only to the number of patients authorized to 
receive the drug for treatment use
340 and would extend for one year (or less, depending on the 
potential impact on drug development) subject to possible renewal.
341 
 
4. Recoverable Costs  
                                                 
334 Id. at 75181; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(c)(2).   
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337 Id.; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(c)(2)(ii). Evidence could include “successful meetings with 
FDA before submission of an [NDA], submission of an NDA, or completion of other significant 
drug development milestones.” Id. at 75172.  
338 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv) (2007).  
339 Proposed Rules for Charging, supra note 2, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75181; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 
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Notably, FDA also proposes to revise the kinds of costs a sponsor could recover when 
charging for an investigational drug.
342  Under the proposed rule, sponsors charging for an 
investigational drug in either a clinical trial or under an expanded access program would be able 
to recover only the “direct costs” of providing the drug.
343  Direct costs include only those that 
can be “specifically and exclusively attributed to providing the drug for the investigational use 
for which FDA has authorized cost recovery.”
344  These include costs per unit to manufacture the 
drug, costs to acquire the drug from another manufacturing source, and direct costs to ship and 
handle the drug.
345 The proposal would not allow recovery for “indirect costs” that are not 
attributable solely to making the drug available for treatment use, such as expenditures to 
produce the drug for commercial sale, as well as research and development, administrative, and 
labor costs.
346 
The proposed rule includes a few concessions to sponsors who provide an investigational 
drug for treatment use either for intermediate-size patient populations or to larger populations 
under a treatment IND or protocol. Such sponsors would be able to recover costs associated with 
administering the program in addition to any direct costs.
347 In all circumstances, sponsors would 
need to provide documentation showing that their cost calculations are consistent with the 
requirements of the regulation.
348 
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VI. CRITICISM OF FDA’S PROPOSAL: CEMENTING THE STATUS QUO  
Despite some reports heralding FDA’s proposal as a victory for patient advocates and a 
major step forward in expanding access to investigational drugs
349, the proposed changes to the 
regulatory scheme are unlikely to increase access. In fact, the proposed regulations generate 
disincentives to industry participation and create further regulatory barriers to patient access to 
expanded access programs.   
FDA states that the purpose of the proposed regulations is to “increase awareness and 
knowledge of expanded access programs” and establish “clearly articulated procedures” for 
obtaining treatment through expanded access, as a result of which more patients with serious or 
immediately life-threatening diseases will get “the earliest possible access” to investigational 
therapies.
350  But FDA has never been the major obstacle for patients seeking expanded access. 
Rather, patients are generally unable to obtain such drugs because manufacturers and drug 
developers lack the proper incentives to participate in expanded access programs.
351  Drug 
companies providing direct access to experimental therapies face increased challenges in 
enrolling clinical trials and may expose themselves to liability for any adverse events resulting 
from use of the unapproved drug.  Adverse events occurring under an expanded access program 
could cause FDA to impose a clinical hold on ongoing investigations.
352 According to Steve 
Walker, co-founder of the Abigail Alliance, many pharmaceutical companies view expanded 
                                                 
349 See, e.g., “FDA to let dying have experimental drugs,” PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Jan. 23, 
2007.  
350 Proposed Rules to Expand Access, supra note 1, at 75149-75150.  
351 See George J. Ames, Cancer and the Constitution, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED.. 408-413 (Jul. 26, 
2007). 
352 Id. But see “Pazdur’s Message: Don’t Fear Expanded Access Programs,” DRUG INDUSTRY 
DAILY, Mar. 13, 2008 (quoting Richard Pazdur, director of FDA’s Office of Oncology Drug 
Products, urging industry “not to fear retaliation from [FDA] when side effects from drugs are 
discovered under expanded access programs.”)    63 
access programs as a “minefield that’s not worth the risk.”
353  Even large pharmaceutical 
companies that do respond to patient petitions for access face pressure from activist groups to 
provide the drug free of charge because insurers rarely pay for experimental treatments.
354 
Industry disincentives are particularly palpable in the biotechnology sector, from which 
an enormous number of modern cancer therapies derive.
355  Unlike traditional pharmaceutical 
companies, the biotechnology industry consists largely of young, small, privately held firms with 
few assets besides ideas and a patent. The road to producing a successful biotech product 
frequently spans between five and ten years and requires hundreds of millions of dollars.
356 
These start-ups rely on venture capital financing in which investors assume extremely high risks 
in exchange for the potential of exceptionally high rates of return,
357 and most seek to license 
successful products to large pharmaceutical companies. Thus, such companies face enormous 
pressure to complete clinical trials and obtain an approved product.
358  
These financial disincentives to providing access are compounded by problems created 
from the often novel and non-traditional nature of biotechnology treatments. Consider Dendreon 
Corporation’s Provenge, a potential therapy for advanced, stage-4 prostate cancer. Provenge is a 
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kind of cancer-fighting vaccine that primes the patient’s immunes system to fight tumors by 
combining the patient’s own T-cells with prostatic acid phosphatase, a protein commonly found 
in prostate cancers.
359 While traditional “pill in a bottle” type pharmaceuticals are characterized 
by low variable production costs, providing Provenge to a patient can cost the manufacturer as 
much as $65,000 per year per patient.
360 
Prostate cancer causes approximately 30,000 deaths per year, and advanced stage-4 
prostate cancer is nearly always fatal. In clinical trials, Provenge failed to stop the progression of 
the disease, but data demonstrated that patients receiving the drug survived approximately 4.5 
months longer than patients receiving standard treatments.
361  In March 2007, an FDA advisory 
committee recommended the drug for approval,
362 but in May the agency withheld approval and 
ordered further clinical trials to provide additional data on the drug’s effectiveness. A year later, 
these clinical trials have not yet been completed
363 and terminally ill patients desperately 
continue to seek access to the drug.
364  
Dendreon has never been able to offer Provenge on an expanded access or compassionate 
use basis.  Scientists at the advisory committee hearing last March, in response to calls from 
patient activists for quick approval of the drug, asked Dendreon to consider providing the drug 
for free on an expanded access basis.
365  According to officers of the company, such a program 
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would be impossible due to capacity constraints and the high cost of providing the drug. Rick 
Hamm, general counsel and a vice president at Dendreon, described the capacity constraints 
facing the company, noting that “for every patient we took on a compassionate use basis, it 
would mean one less patient we could take in a clinical trial,” thereby delaying approval of the 
drug.
366  In addition to capacity, the “personalized” nature of the treatment generates enormous 
costs.  Dendreon sustains considerable operating losses
367 and must fight for every dollar it 
spends.
368  Faced with the costs of “extremely expensive” clinical trials, personalized medicine, 
and a unique and complex antigen, in addition to major capacity constraints, Dendreon simply 
could not provide any access outside of fully enrolled clinical investigations.
369 
Dendreon’s experience is not unique, but FDA’s proposed rules fail to address the reality 
of biotech drug development. Indeed, the proposed rule for charging for investigational drugs 
creates new disincentives to industry participation. Proposed § 312.8 would allow drug sponsors 
to recover only “direct costs,” thereby excluding the vast majority of actual costs incurred,
370 and 
narrows the class of recoverable costs available under current regulations. § 312.7(d) currently 
allows sponsors to recover costs of manufacture, research, development, and handling of an 
investigational drug,
371 but the new regulations would specifically eliminate research and 
development costs and would only allow recovery for administrative costs under a treatment 
protocol.  
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The proposal’s decision to eliminate recovery of research and development costs 
substantially decreases existing industry incentives to participate in expanded access programs. 
Indeed, the potential to recover research and development costs has historically been the only 
economically sound reason to provide expanded access programs at all. The “direct costs” 
included in the proposed regulation represent a relatively insignificant percentage of drug 
development costs and, compared to the intense pressure to obtain speedy approval, would not 
provide sufficient incentive to risk the “minefield” of expanded access programs.
372  This 
disincentive exists even when the investigational compound consists of a small, relatively 
inexpensive molecule  – let alone the expensive proteins typically developed by small 
biopharmaceutical companies.  
The agency’s concern that the present regulations are “not very specific and [do] not 
provide sufficient guidance to sponsors” about the kinds of costs that should be included likely 
derive from the inherent subjectivity surrounding “research and development” costs.
373  FDA’s 
concern stems from the fact that biotechnology firms that have yet to develop an approved drug 
typically possess nothing more than a potentially lucrative patent – virtually all of their costs 
could be considered research and development.
374 Nonetheless, FDA could easily attempt to 
reduce the subjectivity inherent in research and development costs by delineating specific classes 
of acceptable R&D costs. For instance, FDA could specifically exclude the costs of drug 
discovery and product research while allowing a pro rata allocation of costs expended during 
clinical investigations of the drug. Specific guidance about recoverable costs would sufficiently 
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rein in the subjective phrasing of “research and development” while continuing to provide a real 
and powerful incentive to provide expanded access.  
While these proposed restrictions on charging reduce incentives for all drug 
manufacturers, they will particularly affect small biotechnology firms. While some firms might 
not ever be able to overcome preapproval capacity constraints, others undoubtedly would 
respond to real financial incentives to participate in expanded access programs.  For instance, 
FDA could allow sponsors to allocate some fixed overhead costs of production on a pro rata 
basis. Many small companies could use the same facility to manufacture investigational 
treatments both for clinical trials and expanded access patients. Consider Vital Therapies, a 
small, biotechnology firm currently developing a liver failure treatment called ELAD. The 
treatment consists of “dialysis-like cartridges” grown through proprietary human liver cells and 
delivered to the patient through an “extracorporeal bedside unit.” After 16 years of development, 
the company is preparing to undertake Phase 3 trials. The product costs approximately $25,000 
per patient and, because the manufacturing processes represents new ground in cell culture 
development, the company cannot contract out production and must instead construct its own 
GMP manufacturing plant.  Pro rata recovery of some of the significant capital investment and 
fixed manufacturing costs associated with such facilities would provide a real incentive for 
access to companies capable of overcoming capacity limitations.
375 
Although FDA’s proposed rules specifically acknowledge that current FDA procedures 
have not provided adequate access to patients, FDA nonetheless states explicitly that the 
“proposed rule largely clarifies current agency practice”
376 and that the “fundamental problem 
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addressed by the proposed rule is one of incomplete information.”
377 While the proposed rule 
does address the information problems raised by some patient advocates such as NCCS,
378 others 
critics contend that the proposal merely codifies a failed agency policy, and worsens an access 
mechanism that has already proven unworkable in practice.
379  
In fact, the proposed regulation deviates from both statutory and current regulatory text in 
a number of ways that may restrict patient access to experimental drugs. For instance, § 
561(c)(6) of the FD&C Act states that the criteria for obtaining a treatment use IND for a 
“serious” disease or condition consists of “sufficient” evidence of safety and effectiveness. 
Under current regulations, FDA specifically states in § 312.34(a) that, in the case of a serious 
disease, a drug will “ordinarily” be made available during phase 3 investigations, but in 
appropriate circumstances, may be made available during phase 2. Proposed § 312.320(a)(3)(i) 
would require stronger evidence than the current regulation and stronger evidence than 
compelled by FDAMA’s amendments to the FD&C Act, stating that in the case of a serious 
disease, “evidence would ordinarily consist of data from phase 3 trials, but could consist of 
compelling data from completed phase 2 trials….” The current regulations permit access during 
phase 2 trials, but the proposal would delay access until any phase 2 trials are complete. Further, 
the new regulation would require FDA to find phase 2 data to be “compelling” before approving 
access, a vague requirement inserted only to provide FDA with additional discretion to approve 
or refuse access as the agency sees fit. According to Mary Pendergast, former FDA Deputy 
Commissioner and Senior Adviser to the Commissioner, trial design limitations could easily 
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render many phase 2 trials not “compelling,” and FDA’s new proposal thus allows the agency to 
choose “to tie its hands” in making access available.
380 
The proposal’s safeguards to protect against interference with “the initiation, conduct, or 
completion of clinical investigations” or “otherwise compromise the potential development of 
the expanded access use” extends beyond the agency’s authority under FDAMA. Current § 
312.34 does not address the impact of treatment use INDs on current or future clinical trials, but 
§561(c)(5) of the FD&C Act, as inserted by FDAMA in 1997, prohibits expanded access under a 
treatment IND that interferes “with the enrollment of patients in ongoing clinical investigations” 
under §§ 505(i) or 520(g) of the FD&C Act.  The statute does not contemplate that FDA would 
consider the impact a treatment IND may have on future clinical investigations or “potential 
development” of the expanded use. Instead, FDA’s proposal goes beyond the agency’s statutory 
authority in order to provide additional discretion to approve or reject expanded access INDs.  
FDA’s proposed rules for individual patient access also deviate sharply from Congress’ 
grant of authority in FDAMA. § 561(b) of the FD&C Act explicitly dictates that the patient’s 
licensed physician – not FDA – should evaluate the patient’s condition and determine whether 
any “comparable or satisfactory alternative therapy” is available for treatment. § 561(b) grants 
discretion to the patient’s physician to determine whether “the probable risk …from the 
investigational drug…is not greater than the probable risk from the disease….” The proposed 
regulations, however, remove this discretion from the physician and instead gives authority to 
FDA, stating in § 312.305(a) that “FDA must determine that…there is no comparable or 
satisfactory alternative therapy to…treat the disease or condition” and that “FDA must determine 
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that…[t]he potential patient benefit justifies the potential risks of the treatment and those 
potential risks are not unreasonable in the context of the disease or condition to be treated.”  
The proposal not only removes discretion from physicians to the FDA, it also ratchets up 
the standard under which access to investigational drugs will be permitted. § 561(b)(1) of the 
FD&C Act states that the FDA should compare the risk of treatment to the risk of disease, but 
under proposed § 312.305(a)(2) FDA will compare whether the potential patient benefit justifies 
the risk, and further that those risks are not unreasonable. In her comment to the FDA, Mary 
Pendergast notes that § 561(b) does not invite FDA to undertake a “reasonableness” 
determination by authorizing a licensed physician to compare the risks of the treatment to the 
risks of the disease.
381 The agency’s decision to reserve this authority for itself serves only to 
impose an additional regulatory barrier between patient and physician and will not contribute to 
increased patient access.  
FDA’s proposal also fails to address drug sponsors’ concerns about adverse events 
occurring during expanded access programs. Drug sponsors frequently refuse to participate in 
single-patient IND programs out of fear that adverse events in a single-patient trial will weigh 
heavily against approval of the drug upon eventual submission of an NDA.
382 Patients seeking 
single-patient INDs have often progressed to a later stage of disease than those enrolled in 
clinical trials – they are frequently sicker, have exhausted all other options, may well have 
additional illnesses, and may have taken other medications or have other factors rendering them 
                                                 
381 Id. at 5-6. (Noting that although § 506(b)(2) of the FD&C Act allows FDA to determine 
whether there is “sufficient” evidence of safety and effectiveness to support use of an 
investigational drug, that section is embedded in another part of the law and “does not empower 
a risk determination”). 
382 Id. at 9.    71 
particularly vulnerable to adverse events.
383  FDA should specifically address manufacturers’ 
concerns about adverse events under such INDs and allow sponsors to separately report such 
events to FDA in the eventual NDA. The proposal gives no indication that FDA will treat 
adverse effects under single-patient INDs any differently than effects occurring in controlled 
clinical investigations, and the agency’s failure to address these concerns will only bolster 
industry resistance to expanded access. 
The Abigail Alliance maintains that patient access will only increase if FDA commits 
itself to modernizing the clinical trials process and adapting its regulatory regime to the changing 
needs of modern science. Dr. Scott Gottlieb, former FDA Deputy Commissioner for Medical and 
Scientific Affairs, shares this view and has argued that neither court rulings nor legislative action 
will successfully expand access unless FDA adopts better science and a modern approach to 
clinical investigation.
384  Noting that the proposed rules merely “codif[y] what the agency is 
already doing,”  he notes that FDA “already has robust authorities to speed certain drugs to 
market” but fails to make use of them, in some cases because the agency lacks the ability to 
“advance scientific principles that would enable faster approvals.”
385  
Indeed, despite substantial increases in biomedical research and scientific breakthroughs 
in our understanding of disease, the number of new drugs in the pharmaceutical pipeline is 
shrinking,
386 and despite increased numbers of oncology drugs entering clinical trials, the 
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regulatory path has grown longer and more expensive than ever before.
387 As FDA has itself 
acknowledged in its report on the Critical Path Initiative, “[t]he medical product development 
process is no longer able to keep pace with basic scientific innovation.”
388 Steve Walker of the 
Abigail Alliance agrees, arguing that FDA’s refusal to depart from clinical trial methodology 
based on statistics derived from randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled studies hamstrings 
development of modern oncology drugs.
389  Clinical trial methodology has largely crystallized in 
the fifty years since the Drug Amendment of 1962, and FDA’s continued reliance on outdated 
endpoints and statistical analysis may obscure the potential of modern cancer treatments and 
impose unnecessary delays in approval.
390 
FDA’s Critical Path Initiative is intended to address these concerns. Announced in 2004, 
the initiative is FDA’s effort to modernize the science through which FDA evaluates the way 
regulated products are developed and manufactured.  In its 2004 white paper, “Innovation 
Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical Products,” FDA 
acknowledged the decrease in recent innovative medical products submitted for FDA approval, 
the rising costs of clinical development, and the high proportion of products that fail in late 
clinical trials. The report called for a concerted effort to modernize scientific tools and better 
harness the potential of bioinformation used to evaluate safety and effectiveness in new medical 
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products.
391  In 2006, FDA announced a “Critical Path Opportunities List,” in which the agency 
identified needs for modernization among various areas along the critical path of development.
392 
The Opportunities List proposes further research into “innovative” clinical trial design, including 
active control trials, enrichment designs (in which a sub-class of patients likely to experience a 
particularly high response rate are studied), and trial designs built upon accumulated prior 
experience or information.
393 
While the Critical Path Initiative offers a glimmer of hope for modernization at FDA, 
four years after its announcement the Initiative remains little more than a list of ideas on the 
agency’s website. In November 2007, FDA announced the Clinical Trials Transformation 
Initiative (CTTI) in a Memorandum of Understanding for Public Private Partnership with Duke 
University.
394 Although only recently announced, CTTI appears unlikely to generate major 
changes in the clinical trial system. The press release announcing the initiative’s formation states 
that it will explore ways to establish national standards of research, alternative models for 
Institutional Review Boards, accreditation for clinical research professionals, and greater use of 
technology for data management.
395  
VII. CONCLUSION  
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FDA’s proposed rules are likely to decrease patient access to investigational therapies. 
Under increased pressure from patient activism, proposed legislation, and constitutional 
litigation, FDA has tactically announced this proposal in an effort to maintain control of clinical 
investigations and risk/benefit analysis of patient welfare while superficially addressing the 
concerns of critics and terminally ill patients who seek greater autonomy and control over their 
treatment options. The proposal largely codifies existing pathways to expanded access, but grants 
FDA greater discretion to approve or reject applications than current regulations provide, and, in 
removing the ability to recover research and development costs, eliminates the primary financial 
incentive for industry participation in expanded access programs.  Until FDA commits itself to 
truly improving the science of clinical trials and acknowledges the fundamentally different risk 
analysis facing terminally ill patients, such patients will remain frustrated in their attempts to 
obtain access to investigational therapies.  
 
 
 
 